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Preface: 
  
Originally the thought was to do a normal theoretical valuation thesis, in which I 
would pursue to investigate the most pressing matters of public stock valuation. The subject 
of valuation has been an interest of mine since the first time I had courses in them in business 
school. However, during the process of finding the right idea for a master thesis, it occurred to 
me that I had not been subject to almost any degree of private company valuation. This topic 
caught my interest, if just for the fact that I had no knowledge regarding the differences 
between common stock valuation, and private company valuation, so I wanted to learn more 
about this topic. I thank my supervisor Leif Atle Beisland for supporting the idea, giving me 
the incentive to pursue the matter further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This thesis has tried to discuss and analyze how an investor should try to value a 
private company. In addition to special characteristics like the value of control, illiquidity 
discount and lack of diversification, normal valuation issues and techniques have been 
discussed as well. The thesis is divided in three parts. The first is a theoretical part in which 
one considers different valuation models, how to implement these, and the inputs required. 
The second is a part specifically towards the special characteristics of private company 
valuation, and the third is the application part of the thesis, which tries to incorporate the two 
first parts of the thesis. Sørlandschips AS was chosen for application part, but no contact was 
made with the company, so all information presented is public knowledge. The main reason 
for not engaging any contact with the company was to illustrate some of the difficulties that 
occur with private company valuation.  
In the application part the company the residual earnings model and the method of 
comparables were both used. Bold assumptions were made regarding the inputs for valuation, 
due to the lack of information. The values for the equity ranged from 28,59 million to 43,530 
million NOK, depending on which model was used, on assumptions concerning the cost of 
equity. The elements of illiquidity discount, value of control and lack of diversification were 
investigated, and found very difficult to apply to the valuation. However, some efforts were 
made, and the most important lesson learned from this is that private company valuation is far 
more difficult than standard public stocks. The mindset that valuation indeed is just as much 
an art as a science will be reflected on this thesis. In addition, I would like to say that what 
one should do in theory, is not always the best solution in practice, as this thesis has taught 
me.  
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Introduction: 
 
In this thesis the main point of interest was how to value private companies, with 
special interest to what makes them different. Of course, when valuing private firms one has 
to consider all the regular concerns which one has with public company valuation, but there 
are special properties of private firms that have implications on value as well. 
The valuation models discussed and analyzed where the residual earnings model, 
discounted cash flow model and the method of comparables. Of course, there are other 
models as well, but due to the fact that the thesis covers a potentially very wide topic, some 
models had to be left out. The dividend discount model, residual operating income or 
abnormal earnings growth models are not discussed, due to limited time available and the 
intended size of a master’s thesis.  
In the same respect, some of the aspects covered in this thesis are of somewhat limited 
nature, but still included to get the whole perspective. The reformulation of the financial 
statements is one example of this, where almost just the information and theory needed for the 
particular case example was included. Growth and sustainable growth discussion is also of 
limited nature, mainly due to the fact that there is not much information available for private 
firms, especially the case in question, considering the fact that no contact was made with the 
company. This was made purposefully to help illustrate some of the implications of private 
company valuation.’ 
The thesis’s main concern is to discuss what makes private company valuation 
different, general valuation topics and finally how we try to implement it on a particular case. 
In essence these are very broad topics, and general valuation theory could stand alone in a 
thesis. Therefore the reader might get the notion that some elements are lacking, but the main 
idea was to get a bird’s eye view on how we value private firms, so hopefully this was 
achieved. A special interest is done in the theoretical part of the illiquidity theory, with some 
empirical results as well. Some of this is not used in the application part, but it is perhaps the 
main difference between a private company and a public company, so extra efforts were made 
to uncover and discuss it.    
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 Private firms, what make them different? 
 
There are several properties concerning private firms that make different as opposed to 
public companies. This segment will be brief in that respect that most of this information is 
included and discussed in other parts of the thesis.  
 Private firms rarely trade, as opposed to public. This implies that there is no market 
value readily available for the investor to use. In addition to this, private firms rarely give out 
information, in the respect of announcements of investments plans or deals they make, to 
name two examples. This is of course because they don’t have to, as opposed to public firms 
for whom there are rules that control the disclosure of information.  
 In addition to the lack of information made public, there is limited accounting 
information as well. As an example of this for the case in question, later to be discussed, only 
three years of accounting data where public. This of course raises the uncertainty concerning a 
number of aspects on valuation.  
 Another point of interest is that there might be what is called discretionary expenses in 
private companies. These are expenses that are unnecessary, causing the accounting numbers 
to potentially be somewhat suspect. In addition there according to Damodaran(2002) potential 
accounting differences across private companies and public, making the it difficult to compare 
results.    
 Theoretical segment: Valuation models. 
  
In this part of the thesis we will look into the three valuation models chosen for 
theoretical discussion. First out is the discounted cash flow model.  
Valuation models: 1)Discounted Cash flow analysis 
 Introduction: 
 
 A very common valuation model often used in financial textbooks is the discounted 
cash flow model. In the following section this model will be outlined, variations of the models 
will be demonstrated, the benefits and disadvantages will be discussed, and it will briefly 
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discussed how to implement the model to the best of its use. The notion of the discounted 
cash flow model is that just as you can value projects from its discounted cash flows, the 
firm’s value is the present value of the cash flow of the entire firm (Penman,2010). 
  The perhaps simplest version of this model is presented by Penman (2010,pg 123) and 
looks like:  : 1.1  	
      . 
 Where  is cash flow from operations in year 1 subtracted by cash investment in 
operations in year 1 This is called the free cash flow because it is the part of the cash flows 
that is free to both equity and debt holders after reinvestment in operations. 
  is the cost 
of capital for equity minus the estimated growth in cash flows.Net debt is the value of debt in 
year 0, at market value. 
It is sometimes referred to as the constant growth model, in that it assumes constant 
growth over the lifespan of the investment. With the model one basically just have to forecast 
cash flows and investments one year ahead and make estimates about the constant growth rate 
of free cash flows. The formula itself is an annuity, in the respect that the amount each year is 
the same, and the fact that it is assumed to continue forever makes it a perpetuity 
(Penman.2010). However, as this simplified model implies, this version of the discounted 
cash flow would only work with a constant growth rate. For instance, if we assume that the 
business in question is in a cycle where it’s investment opportunities at present time is 
expected to generate large returns, and hence large growth in the cash flows, but is considered 
to decline to a constant rate within 5 years? In that case the smoothened constant growth rate 
would simply not make a correct estimate. If one can estimate the next few years’ growth 
rates by a degree of certainty, one could expand the model to something like this: 
 : 1.2  	
     
! "#
#
 ! "#$%%  .… 
'' 
(
 )''  	
*
 . 
Where 	* is the value of net debt at the time for the valuation, +, is the weighted average 
cost of capital for the firm, and the cash flows are forecasted and discounted till the time of 
the forecast horizon T. The term )''
 is known as the continuing value. As noted, forecasting 
to an infinite forecast horizon, which the last version of the model do, is a tedious and 
complicated procedure. Instead, we could do like in the first version, assume the free cash 
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flows at the end of the forecast horizon will continue as a constant perpetuity. The continuing 
value is calculated as this(Penman,2010,pg 120): 
 : 1.1  -./'0'01
 
This way of calculating the continuing value is used when there is no expected growth 
after the forecast horizon t. If there is one could use(Penman,2010,pg 120): 
  
      : 1.2  -./'0'01
 
As you can see from formula DCF: 1.2, this continuing value at time T is then discounted 
back to the present value at time 0. This last formula could be preferred if one assumed 
varying growth rates until a certain point, T, where the growth would either converge towards 
zero, as with CV:1.1, or continue at a constant rate as in CV:1.2. However, it is unlikely that 
all firms have positive cash flows at the time of valuation, and in addition, that the cash flows 
are expected to grow constantly over the entire forecast horizon. One can the instead use the 
formula provided by Penman (2010,pg 120) which looks like this: 
 : 1.3  	
     
!## "
#
 !%%"%  .… 
'' 
(
 )''  	
*
 . 
 
Here we manually estimate the cash flows and required investments for each year, instead 
of assuming a constant growth, or varying growth rate. However, even if the cash flow 
models are flexible in the respect of varying growth rates and free cash flows, there are some 
problems that cannot be negated easily if the firm in question has certain properties. 
 Disadvantages with the discounted cash flow model: 
 
As noted the discounted cash flow model is dependent on having positive cash flows in the 
numerator of the formula, to achieve a positive value for the equity(the continuing value to be 
precise). However, this is not always the case with many firms. Start up firms, cyclical firms 
and firms in financial trouble might not have positive free cash flows for the near foreseeable 
future and make it difficult to estimate the correct value of the firm using this model. 
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Whatever the reason for the negative cash flows at the valuation horizon, there are certain 
issues with using this model. A start up firm for instance invests heavily in the beginning of 
the firm’s lifespan, hoping to acquire market shares and the consumer’s interest. Inevitably, 
there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding when and how much the firm will earn, both 
profits and cash flows. The situation makes forecasting very difficult, in that one has to 
estimate when the positive cash flows will occur, and to what rate of return they will earn as 
well. If one for example calculates that the free cash flow will be positive after 5 years, and 
that the growth in free cash flow stabilizes five years after this, one is left with an estimation 
based almost purely on estimates with very high degree of uncertainty. One of the tenets of 
fundamental analysis are :”Anchor a valuation on what you know, rather than on 
speculation”(Penman,2010,pg 19). If one is forced to speculate like in the example above, due 
to the negative cash flows, this principles is clearly broken. One could easily imagine a start 
up firm having positive earnings before the cash flows, due to the degree of investment in the 
beginning. This would negate some of the speculation and likely prove a much more sound 
valuation method in situations with negative cash flows in the first years of a forecasting 
period. Before the discussion of earnings based and other models are to be discussed, other 
possible issues regarding the discounted cash flow model will be outlined.   
However, even if positive, the free cash flow could easily be manipulated, at least in the 
short run. Consider a firm with free cash flow of 4 million per present day. In addition assume 
we are applying : 1.1  	
       to calculate the value of the equity of the 
firm. For sake of simplicity we assume there is no growth and that the cost of equity is 10% 
and that the value of net debt is equal to 10 million. These assumptions give a rough 
estimation of : 1.1  	
  3	,  10  30 678879:. Further to this, consider we have an 
identical firm except they have reduced their investments so that the free cash flows are 5 
million, instead of 4. The calculation then becomes entirely different and the second firm is 
then worth 40 million, instead of 30 like the other one. This example shows us that one has to 
be very careful when estimating value based on cash flows. Naturally if both firms had the 
same growth opportunities, not investing as much, should cause the price of firm to, too 
decrease, and not increase. So in essence one has to calculate the potential growth of 
comparable firms based on how much they invest and what growth opportunities they have. 
 This example leads us to the description of free cash flow model being partly a 
liquidation concept(Penman,2010). He says:”Free cash flow is not really a concept about 
13 
 
adding value in operations. It confuses investments (and the value they create) with the 
payoffs with investments, so it is partly an investment or a liquidation 
concept”(Penman,2010,pg 122).  
What is meant by this is that increased free cash flow is not necessarily a sign of increased 
value, but rather a decrease in investments. The reason is that if a firm decreases its 
investments in operations, all else equal, the free cash flow for that particular period increases. 
One can easily argue that if a firm gives up investment opportunities so that they can pay 
dividends, or pay down debt, the cash flow from operations in future periods would decrease. 
If the firm has investment opportunities with positive net present value, this would of course 
decrease the value of the firm, not increase it. Hence one could on the other hand imagine that 
if a firm with lots of positive net present value opportunities would invest in the degree that 
their free cash flows become negative. If one is not careful, this could be interpreted as a loss 
of value, although one knows that firms that earn returns greater than their cost of capital is 
increasing in value.         
Another disadvantage mentioned by Penman(2010) is that this method does not measure 
value added in the short run, is value is neither recognized once created. As implied, if the 
firm invests heavily, and has negative free cash flows as a result, the value added by 
investments is not recognized. This might result in a forecasting process that is more difficult 
than it should be and forces too much emphasis of the valuation on speculation, instead of 
fundamental values.  
The last disadvantage mentioned is that continuing value have to high weights in the 
valuation(Penman,2010). He says this to emphasize that discounted cash flow does not anchor 
valuation on something that we already know. The short term forecasts of cash flows might be 
relatively certain, but other than that, there is no real certainty about the valuation. An 
example of a fundamental anchor is the book value of equity. It is unlikely that the firm is 
worth less than that, and gives a good start for the valuation. In addition to the lack of anchor, 
free cash flows might often be negative, forcing the positive part of the valuation(continuing 
value) to make up for huge amounts of the total value. Relying too much on speculative 
components like this is not preferable in valuation. 
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 Benefits of the discounted cash flow model:  
 
There are not all negatives about this method. The two main benefits mentioned by 
Penman(2010) are that it is easy familiar concept and the fact that cash flows are not affected 
by accounting rules. Most people vaguely familiar with finance and economics know how to 
calculate the present value of an investment, based on its cash flows. Also, people within a 
firm might be comfortable with the concept as well, as most project managers calculate cash 
flows from their projects and discount them to find out if they are worth the while. Free cash 
flows are basically just the sum of all the business’s projects cash flows. Accounting rules 
does not affect the free cash flows, but accounting might still matter through the adjustment of 
accruals to get from operating cash flow from the most common financial rapports to the free 
cash flow input in the valuation model. 
 
 
 Implementation: Statement of Cash flows, reformulating, forecasting 
accruals: 
  
When using the discounted cash flow method, we need the proper input, free cash flow to 
get a value. As Penman(2010) states the cash flow from operations from both GAAP and 
IFRS are not numbers that we can apply directly in the valuation. The reason is that there are 
potential financial items, in the cash from operations in these rapports. 
Operating activities implies only activities that are connected to the business end of things, 
not financial. So when we talk about excess cash being invested in interest bearing securities 
for example, this is items that are supposed to be noted as financial items and its impact 
removed from cash from operations. In addition to this dividends and taxes might be reported 
in the wrong section. In addition to the reformulation problem, one also needs to forecast the 
accruals which are the reason why cash flows and earnings don’t match up. 
Penman(2010) argues that forecasting earnings and sales before free cash flows is better 
than to try to forecast cash flows directly. In addition to that, one has convert earnings, to cash 
flows by adjusting for accruals, and then deducts the anticipated investment in operations, to 
get the free cash flow. This thesis will not go into how to forecast accruals and investment in 
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operations to get the free cash flow forecasts, and then use DCF valuations. There are two 
main reasons for this, it is too time consuming, and particularly since the case in question has 
negative cash flows, which makes this forecasting even more unpredictable.  
 Summary discounted cash flow analysis:  
 
A reasonable amount of time has been used to illustrate the discounted cash flow in this 
thesis. This was done due to its popularity and familiarity. The different variations of the 
model as far as growth is concerned are reasoning one can apply in other models as well. 
There are as mentioned several potential pitfalls using the discounted cash flow model. 
Although popular and widely used, it has proven to be potentially flawed, and difficult to 
apply in certain cases. We will see in the application part of the model, if the model’s benefits 
outweigh its disadvantages, to the case in hand.   
 
  
Valuation models: 2) Residual Earnings Model: 
 Introduction 
 
The next valuation model to be discussed is the residual earnings model, presented by 
Penman(2010). The model will be outlined, variations of the model will be shown, benefits 
and disadvantages will be discussed, some with examples to illustrate these points, and some 
of the issues will be referred back to the discounted cash flow model discussed in the previous 
segment.  
 Penman(2010) talks about principles of fundamental analysis in his book Financial 
statement analysis and security valuation. One of those principles is that you should beware of 
paying too much for growth(Penman,2010). As mentioned, another important principle is that 
you should anchor a valuation on what you know rather than speculation(Penman,2010). The 
residual earnings model as presented by Penman(2010,pg 153) does exactly that: 
  	
  ;	  <
  
<
#
#
 <
%%  = 
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 Where ;	 is the book value of common equity, year 0, or the year where the valuation 
is made. >?  is the residual earnings for each period, discounted by the cost of equity, 
. 
This first version is for a going concern, with an infinite forecast horizon, which is very 
difficult to use, but serves as an example of the principle, that the value is the sum of the book 
value of common equity, and all discounted residual earnings. Residual earnings are defined 
as(Penman,2010,pg 153): 
  >?,  ?@A:,  !
  1";, 
 Where >?, is the residual earnings at time t. ?@A:, is the forecasted earnings at time t, 

 is the cost of equity and ;, is the book value of common equity last year. One has 
residual earnings or excess profits as it’s also called, only if the earnings in the period are 
larger than the required return multiplied with the book value of common equity last year. The 
point is that cost of equity multiplied with last year’s book value of common equity is what 
the business is supposed to generate, given its risk, and that value is only created if the 
earnings exceed this required amount. 
The principle of not paying too much for growth refers to the fact that growth is 
uncertain, hence you might end up paying for false promises, or estimations. In addition, 
growth itself has to be value adding, which is not always the case as will be shown now, in 
estimating the value of a savings account, using Penman’s(2010 example on page 152, in his 
book of Financial Statement and security analysis; 
 
 
 
The example used looks like this: 
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 Take note that I have calculated the net present value of the “project” of investing in a 
savings account. This is done to more clearly illustrate the point of the residual earnings(done 
to illustrate it gives the same result as disc cash flow, given they both run out the same time, 
and there are no accruals). Here the earnings made up each year from the 5% interest are 
taken out as dividend each year, instead of reinvesting it in the savings account. As you can 
see the net present value of this is 0, which means the savings account is worth its book value, 
or the initial investment. In the next example the payout policy is of the other end of the 
spectrum, with zero payouts: 
 
   
 Here net present value of the project is again 0, with only one big payout at the end of 
the projects lifespan. Cash flows are zero until the last year, but still this payout “policy” 
gives the exact same value. Earnings are growing, as opposed to the example with no 
reinvesting, yet there are still no residual earnings or value creation. In both situations the 
residual earnings are zero, which makes the value of the savings account equal its book value, 
as we know from the residual earnings model where the value is book value plus present 
value of residual earnings.  
Scenario 1( Earnings withdrawn each year (full payout)
Required return 0,05
Forecast year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Earnings 5 5 5 5 5
dividends 5 5 5 5 5
Book value 100 100 100 100 100 100
Residual Earnings 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flows 5 5 5 5 105
Investment -100
Discount rate 1,05 1,1025 1,157625 1,21550625 1,27628156
Present value of CF -100 4,76190476 4,535147392 4,31918799 4,11351237 82,2702475
NPV 0
Scenario 2, No withdrawels (zero payout)
Forecast year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Required return 0,05
Earnings 5,00 5,25 5,51 5,79 6,08
Dividends 0,00
Book value 100,00 105,00 110,25 115,76 121,55 127,63
Residual Earnings 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Free cash flows 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 127,63
Investment -100
Discount rate 1,05 1,1025 1,157625 1,21550625 1,27628156
Present value of CF -100 0 0 0 0 100
NPV 0
18 
 
 There are five important thing to take not off, as presented by Penman(2010), which is 
perhaps even more clearly shown with a discounted cash flow valuation as well as the residual 
earnings valuation. First is that the savings account is worth the same regardless of whether 
you extract money out of it or not, this shows that dividends is potentially a non value 
creating activity. Second, an asset is only worth a premium over its book value of it generates 
earnings over the required return. Thirdly, growth at the required rate of return, or below, does 
not add value, as shown in the second example. Fourth, an asset that doesn’t pay dividends 
can still be valued from its book value and expected earnings which is an important principle 
when considering the vast majority of textbooks putting large emphasis on dividend discount 
models. Fifth and lastly, the value of the savings account does not rely on the free cash flows, 
and he points out that you cannot value scenario 2 from its cash flows. I would partly 
disagree, as I have shown in the additional discounted cash flow valuation. However, this is 
assuming the savings account is terminated in the last year; I record the accumulated savings 
as free cash flow the last year, and discount it back to year 0. The conclusion remains the 
same though, the net present value is still 0. 
 The three cases of valuation: 
 
 As noted, forecasting to an infinite time horizon, is both problematic, and extremely 
time consuming. If valuing a going concern, the most appropriate would to do like shown in 
the discounted cash flow model, to calculate a continuing value at the end of the forecast 
horizon T. Penman(2010) shows three cases, where we have no residual earnings at the end, 
positive residual earnings but no growth, and a case with positive residual earnings growing at 
a constant rate. As he mentions these three cases will cover most of the valuation cases on run 
into in practice(Penman,2010,pg 161):  
 Case 1 valuation: 	
  ;	  <
  
<
#
#
 <
%%  
Here there are no residual earnings after the forecast period, which in this example is 3 
years. A situation where the firm would revert to zero residual earnings would be in a market 
where the competitiveness of the industry drove away earnings over the required return, or for 
example a firm you’d expect to lose its competitive advantage due to new entries, change of 
managers etc. There is no continuing premium over book value in this case, since expected 
residual earnings are zero at the forecast horizon, and hence no continuing value is calculated. 
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Case 2 valuation however is where we expect there to be residual earnings at the forecast 
horizon, but without growth(Penman,2010,pg 163): 
 
Case 2 valuation: 	
  ;	  <
  
<
#
#
 = <
''  !
<
'0
 "/

-
 
The principle remains the same, forecast residual earnings up to the forecast horizon t, 
and discounts the residual earnings with the equity cost of capital. In addition, we have a 
continuing value of residual earnings, or a continuing premium as Penman(2010) calls it, 
which is discounted back to its present value as well. If one is assuming that the residual 
earnings are positive, still after the forecast horizon, but not growing, this model is 
appropriate to use. These two first examples are probably the most common once you’ll need 
when valuing a firm. The reason being that most firms are not in a position where they can 
outfox their opponents for what analysts almost would call “infinity”. However, there are 
firms that earn and grow residual earnings for the entire lifespan of the business. It is not 
unlikely that companies like Microsoft, apple, Coca Cola Company, etc in their prime and 
perhaps even now, could justify such an assumption of growing continuing residual earnings. 
This brings us to the case 3 valuation(Penman,2010,pg 163): 
Case 3 valuation:  
	
  ;	  >?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Case 3 is similar to case two, however here we are assuming a constant growth rate at 
the forecast horizon at time T. If a firm has expected growth in residual earnings until the 
forecast horizon, one might have to assume a constant rate of growth after the forecast 
horizon. This assumption has to be treated with caution. If one is assuming growing residual 
earnings for the lifetime of a business, one is also assuming the company will maintain and 
strengthen its competitive advantage for “infinity”. The interpretation is that constant RE 
means that the current excess profits and hence position in the market will be maintained 
whereas the growing excess profit as residual earnings also is called implies a strengthened 
position for the business for eternity. However, a firm might have growing residual earnings 
for the foreseeable future, and the analyst might be unable to determine when it stops, or 
eventually approaches zero. There might be cases where it is warranted, but as pointed out, it 
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the assumption of a continuing value with growing residual earnings has to be treated with 
caution. 
Which case valuation to chose is as noted dependent on the market the firm is 
operating in, perhaps the firms history of keeping the competitive advantage, government 
involved etc. The factors that influence residual earnings, and in essence, the ability to have 
earnings over the required amount, are several and if possible, should be taken into account 
when considering what case of valuation the firm is likely to be closest to. Basically the 
reasons for residual earnings can perhaps be best explained by microeconomic theory, where 
on claims that excess profits are only temporary, since new enters in the market will occur. 
However that conclusion is based on perfectly efficient markets, which is a theoretically 
sound ideology, but not true in real life. The growth rate, and residual earnings forecast 
basically becomes a subjective assessment, but it should be anchored on sound economic 
theory and the interpretation of the current state of the market. Perhaps even porters five 
forces, which analyze a current business position and opportunities, could be used as an extra 
tool for analysts to discover a larger part of the picture, instead of just looking at numbers. 
Finance is not all about numbers; it is also subject to personal opinions and interpretations. 
The numbers are a good starting point, but perhaps other tools can be used as well. Knowing 
the business is a part of being analyst, the porter-five forces is merely an example of how to 
put the knowing the business into a system. Porter’s five forces will not be used in this thesis, 
it is just an example of a tool that might help in the analysis. 
The segment that follows will discuss the advantages, disadvantages and features of 
the residual earnings model as presented by Penman (2010). 
Advantages of the residual earnings model: 
Focus on value drivers: 
 
He says that the residual earnings model;” focuses on the profitability of investment 
and growth in investment, which drive value, directs strategic thinking to these 
drivers”(Penman,2010,pg 169). As mentioned and shown in the savings account example, a 
firm can only add value if it earns a rate of return over its required return. In addition, one can 
say that a firm can increase its value by increasing investments that earn a rate higher than the 
required return. The present value of the equity is defined as the book value of equity and the 
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sum of residual earnings, discounted to its present value. If we look at the formula for residual 
earnings again: 
>?,  ?@A:,  !
  1";, 
Where ?@A:, is the earnings given from last year’s book value of common 
equity;,, and !
  1";, is the required amount. Earnings this year could be written as; 
?@A:-  >F?- $ ;, , since >F?-, the return on common equity, is defined as: 
>F?-  ?@A:-;,  
Substituting >F?- $ ;, for ?@A:, in the formula gives us: 
>?,  !>F?- $ ;,"  !
  1";, 
Or we could rewrite it as: 
  
>?,  G>F?-  !
  1"H;, 
Here it is clear to see, that value, or residual earnings, can be increased either be 
increasing return on common equity >F?- or, by increasing book value: ;,, given that: 
>F?- I !
  1". This was done to show that the residual earnings model focuses on 
profitable investments, which earn return above the required amount, so that they can increase 
their value by either increasing that current rate of return, or increase investment if they have 
an investment opportunity that is expected to earn above the required return. 
Incorporates the financial statements: 
 
The second advantage mentioned by Penman(2010) is the fact that this method of 
valuation incorporates the use of financial statements. The first obvious advantage is that this 
allows us to account for the value that is already there in the book value, as opposed to 
discounted cash flow valuation where we don’t have this feature. This goes back to the tenet; 
“anchor a valuation on what you know rather than speculation”(Penman,2010,pg 19). In 
addition, this allows us to forecast income statements and balance sheets, rather than cash 
flows. This can be an advantage if the cash flows from the investments are hard to predict. 
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Uses accrual accounting 
 
Accrual accounting uses the matching principle, which basically means that earnings 
are reported when they are earned, regardless of when the cash flow effect occurs. For 
instance, if a firm sells on credit the revenues are reported immediately, even though the 
payment is yet to be made. Same principle goes for accruals. Different rules applies, but 
whichever depreciation plan used, an investment in an asset that is supposed to generate value 
is not deducted the current years financial income statement by its full amount. Rather a 
somewhat appropriate amount is deducted as an operating expense, to illustrate the amount 
needed to generate this year’s revenue. This hardly works perfect in real life, but at least it’s 
more accurate than a cash flow perspective which treats the investment to its full amount the 
moment the investment is made. So in essence, as mentioned previously, discounted cash 
flow method treats the investment as a loss of value, at least that is how it appears, because 
the cash flow generated from an investment comes later, earnings on the other hand is likely 
to arrive much sooner, and likely to be easier to anticipate.  
Shorter forecast horizon 
 
The fact that value generated is recognized sooner with accounting principles as 
opposed to cash flows, can make the forecast horizon shorter. For a firm with ongoing 
investments and negative cash flows, the value from these investments can be hard to 
recognize, as opposed to the residual earnings. A firm that has lots of investments 
opportunities and invest in them could have negative free cash flows but positive earnings. 
The analyst’s predicament then, if using discounted cash flow method, is to predict when, and 
by how much the cash flows will turn positive. Free cash flow is as mentioned the cash 
available to both equity and debt holders/issuers. Operating income after tax, before interest is 
the income also available to the same groups. However, accounting principles is as mentioned 
not the same as cash in and out of the business, due to the accruals. In principle operating 
income and free cash flows should in the long run accumulate to be the same amount, but 
since accounting principles tries to account for the value added when it occurs, instead of the 
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cash flow, the cash flow’s might be delayed, and hence harder to predict. This makes 
valuation models with earnings in focus potentially easier as far as forecast horizon concerns.   
Protection against accounting created earnings: 
 
Another benefit of the residual earnings model, as opposed to regular forecasting and 
discounted earnings, is that it protects the investor from earnings created by accounting. An 
example by this, as given by Penman(2010), is if for instance management writes down 
inventory by a certain amount, in accordance to lower of cost or market rule. If then these 
goods are sold in the year to follow, consequently, the cost of the goods sold will be lower as 
well, appearing to have created earnings. However, this will be discovered with the residual 
earnings model, since the book value cannot stay the same if the inventory is written down. 
For instance, if you have a firm that has 15 million in earnings, 100 million in book value, and 
expected growth of 5% of residual earnings, the residual earnings table could look something 
like this 
 
Where all earnings are reinvested, no dividends. The earnings are growing with 12% 
in this example, which is 2% above the required rate of 10%. The residual earnings growth is 
increasing but we are assuming a rate of 5% of constant growth is appropriate. Then we can 
value the firms equity  
 	
  100  J,K,,	L  236 678879: 
If we then assumes the write down occurs, at 10 million, the table would look like this: 
 
Here the residual earnings are higher the first year, so it might appear as if there was 
value created. If one didn’t take into account that these temporary earnings does not create 
Example 1 (normal) 0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00
Earnings 15,00 16,80 18,82 21,07 23,60 26,44
Book value 100,00 116,80 135,62 156,69 180,29 206,73
RE(10% charge) 6,80 7,14 7,51 7,93 8,41
Re growth rate 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,06
Example 2(accounting earnings) 0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00
Earnings 15,00 26,80 18,82 21,07 23,60 26,44
Book value 90,00 116,80 135,62 156,69 180,29 206,73
RE(10% charge) 17,80 7,14 7,51 7,93 8,41
Re growth rate -0,60 0,05 0,06 0,06
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growth one could easily have overvalued the company due to the write down of inventory, 
and the following lower cost of goods sold. But the inventory has already been paid for and 
there is no more cash to reinvest at the rate of 12%, so the new valuation would look like this: 
 	
  90  O,K	,  P
O,3
,,	LQ /1,1  236 678879: 
So no value has been created, as you can see. The increased residual earnings in year 1 
is offset by the decreased book value, and as long as we discount the continuing value in year 
2, we are in the clear.   
  
Protection from paying too much for earnings generated by investment: 
 
In addition to protecting against earnings growth the residual earnings model perhaps 
main point is that it protects investors against paying too much for growth generated by 
investment. We know that ; “Firms can grow earnings simply by investing 
more”(Penman,2010,pg 170). And he further states:”If those investments fail to earn a return 
above the required return, they will grow earnings but they will not grow 
value”(Penman,2010,pg 170). An example of this can be that if you borrow at 7% interest to 
invest, you only have to earn more than this to increase the earnings. However, if the required 
return on the investment is above the expected return, your investment is losing value. Once 
investors realize the return is not matching the risk of the investment, they will sell their 
shares, dropping the price of the stock, and decreasing the value of the firm. A simple 
example to demonstrate this would be a firm that currently has book value of 100 million of 
equity, 10 million in current earnings expected to perpetuate forever, with a current cost of 
equity of 10%. Assume that book value of equity is equal to the market value of equity with: 
  
	
  100,1  100 678879: 
Let’s say this firm invests in a new project, with the cost of 50 million, which is 
expected by the managers to generate 2 million in earnings, as a constant perpetuity. The 
return on common equity is then 4% (2/50). The new value of the equity then is: 
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	
  120,1  120 678879: 
At the first look of it, it appears that the investment has created value, since the 
capitalized earnings are higher. However, the investment cost 50 million and only generated 
20 million, so the firm is in essence worth 30 million less. The residual earnings model will 
prevent these potential misguiding valuations of occurring as this next example will 
demonstrate: 
   
>?,  G0,1  !1,1  1"H100  0 
Residual earnings in the first scenario are 0, since the firm is only generating its 
required return. With the new investment it becomes: 
   
>?,  G0,08  !1,1  1"H150  3 678879: 
Using the residual earnings model case 2 with no growth in residual earnings. 
 	
  150  T	,  120 678879: 
By separating the book value and the residual earnings the model shows that value of 
the equity is lower than its book value, due to unprofitable investments, hence the investment 
should never been made in the first place.  
Converting analysts forecast to valuation: 
 
Another benefit with the residual earnings model is that you don’t have to convert 
analyst’s forecasts of earnings to cash flows, to question whether you agree or not with the 
valuation. As  mentioned by Penman(2010), forecasting cash flows without forecasting 
earnings and revenues are a difficult procedure. Forecasting the accruals can be a difficult 
procedure, and with this method one does not have to go through that trouble, and instead use 
the analyst’s forecasts of earnings more directly. 
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Capturing value not on the balance sheet—for all accounting methods: 
 
Another benefit of the residual earnings calculation is that it captures the value added 
from assets that are not recorded by their full amount, or even noted as an expense, not an 
asset. An example of this is the research and development expenses, or expenses on 
advertising that links to the power of the brand name of a product. These are assets that 
generate value, although not recorded as such in the balance sheet by the rules of GAAP. 
However, as noted by Penman(2010); “higher residual earnings compensate for the lower 
book values, to produce a valuation that corrects the low book value”(Penman,2010,pg 172). 
This can be best shown with a hypothetical example where we first treat an investment in an 
advertising campaign as an asset, and then just as an expense. 
Let’s say we a firm with 90 million in book value, 10% cost of equity, 15 million 
expected earnings year 1, and this firm invested in a advertising campaign to strengthen their 
brand name and increase sales and earnings in the future. We also assume this investment was 
of the magnitude of 10 million dollars, with expected return of 15%. Without considering it as 
an asset the residual earnings would be: 
>?,  15  !1,1  1"90  6 678879:. 
The value of the equity: 
  	
  90  J	,  150 678879:. 
If we then assume the brand investment was recorded as an asset, the book value 
would increase to 100 million and the residual earnings would be: 
   
>?,  15  !1,1  1"100  5 678879:. 
The value of the equity would now be: 
  	
  100  L	,  150 678879:.  
So as you can see whether or not this investment is recorded as an asset or not, is 
irrelevant as far as residual earnings valuation is concerned. The increased book value again 
offsets the decreased residual earnings, so in this case the accounting principle is irrelevant. 
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This example is similar to the example above with the accounting created earnings, but in this 
case the assumption is no growth in residual earnings. 
 
Residual earnings model disadvantages: 
 
The two disadvantages is that the model ; 1) Requires an understanding of accrual 
accounting and 2) That it relies on accounting numbers which can be suspect(Penman,2010). 
Especially with private firms this is the case, where one can have managers not separating 
dividends and their own salaries, making it hard to estimate a proximate for the earnings, in 
order to value the firm/equity. These two disadvantages will not be discussed in this segment, 
but brought up during the valuation to give greater emphasis to what to look for in the specific 
case of private firm valuation 
Summary: 
 
The residual earnings model indeed looks like progress in relation to the discounted 
cash flow model which has been there for several years. As mentioned there are several 
benefits, with the most apparent one’s being that you don’t need positive free cash flows to 
value a firm or its equity, and that you can separate the what you know(book value) from the 
more speculative component of growth(continuing value). In addition to that, the model 
protects the analyst from paying too much for earnings growth, be it growth generated by 
accounting, or by unprofitable investments. Last but not least, it may serve as an easier 
method of comparisement, given that analysts forecast earnings and not cash flows, if one 
understands how the accrual accounting works. 
Valuation models: 3)Method of comparables 
 
Introduction: 
 
As mentioned previously, there are several methods to value a firm, and the method of 
comparables will be discussed in this section. As with any model, the benefits/disadvantages 
have to be considered, before implementing the model. In this segment we will look into some 
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of the variations of the multiples, conceptual issues and reverse engineering, the three steps of 
implementation by Penman(2010) along with some implementation problems.  
The method of comparables is perhaps the simples of methods to use, as it does not 
require any specific accounting knowledge, or spending lots of time and effort on forecasting. 
Comparables is simply a ratio, for which a stock/asset currently trades at. Price to earnings, 
price to book and price to sales are common ratios or multiples if you’d like, to estimate a 
company’s value. Multiple analysis uses minimum amounts of information, so of course, on 
cannot rely its result completely, but as various authors say, it serves as a benchmark.  
 Different variations of the model: 
 
In addition to variations regarding the whether the denominator is earnings, book 
value or sales, there are also variations within these. Damodaran(2002) mentions that the 
earnings can be from the recent financial year(that yields the current PE ratio), expected 
earnings per share for the next financial year(yielding the forward PE) or the last four quarters 
earnings, which gives what he calls the trailing PE. If the current price is used in the 
numerator, one can argue that the expectations for the next year earnings are included in this 
price. So if the earnings are expected to increase(so the denominator is larger), the P/E ratio 
will decrease, since the current price then is divided by a larger number than if one uses 
current price divided by last year’s earnings. In a matter of consistency, the most appropriate 
seems to be to use the expected earnings, since the price in the numerator includes the 
market’s expectations for the firm growth in earnings. By the same rationale, one would 
assume that the trailing P/E ratio also is more accurate, and then the one with the earnings 
used is those from the last financial year. As we will see however, later in this thesis, the 
quarterly numbers, expectations of earnings or even the last financial years statement might 
not be available, which can be the case with private firms.  
Potential conceptual and implementation issues: 
Conceptual: Lack of fundamental anchoring 
 
As mentioned previously, the use of comparables is by far easier than most other 
valuation methods. However, this advantage comes with a cost. There are both conceptual and 
implementation issues that needs to be discussed. First off are the conceptual issues, which 
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will be highlighted, and solutions to these issues will be proposed. The first conceptual issue 
to be discussed, as mentioned by Penman (2010), is the fact that the method is not anchored 
on anything fundamental, and that if not careful, it can be circular. When one uses other 
companies’ prices and earnings ratios, to find the value of another company, one is basically 
assuming that the average (if one uses such metrics) reflects the true value of the firm in 
question. That implicitly means that one is assuming the value creating factors like growth, 
cost of capital and cash flow/earnings potential are similar. So if this is not the case, even if 
the market is efficient, the value might not be correct due to differences in the hidden 
fundamentals, which can somewhat be revealed with reverse engineering, as shown later in 
this segment. 
 As Penman(2010) says, one of the tenets of fundamental valuation is that you should 
not use price to challenge value, and that is basically what happens with the use of 
comparables. When valuing public stocks and assuming that price equals value for the 
comparable firms, one could just assume the market price for the company in question was 
efficient in the first place. However, for companies that are rarely traded, such as private 
companies, it can, as discussed later, be more legitimate to use the method of comparables. 
One can then relax the assumption of prices being efficient and at least get a benchmark for 
what the private firm in question should trade at, if not what it’s actually worth. This view is 
supported by the fact the investment bankers floating initial public offerings use the methods 
of comparables to get an estimate of the markets valuation of the issue (Penman,2010). This is 
also noted by Damodaran(2002), who uses the frase; “mood of the market” to describe what 
the relative valuation captures. Still, one cannot ignore the fact that the mood of the market 
might be far of the theoretical intrinsic or fundamental value. Intrinsic value is known as the 
value a stock should trade at, given a certain valuation model, which is based on 
fundamentals.  
Penman(2010) for instance mentions the use of price multiples for valuation during the 
initial public offering boom for teleservicing firms, as a main reason for the prices to fall 
dramatically after that period. Basically, if all market participants are overvaluing the 
companies at which you use as comparables, your estimation will be too high as well. 
However, if one studies the multiples, especially the price/earnings multiple, one can as noted 
use what Penman(2010) refers to as reverse engineering to find out what the market expects 
from growth rate in earnings and the cost of equity. There are some circumstances where the 
use of reverse engineering should be applied; when you’re uncertain whether risk, growth 
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potential or earnings/cash flows are the same, or if you believe the market is 
over/undervaluing the sector/market as a whole. Below follows an example on how to do this 
with the P/E ratio. 
  Let’s say we have found an almost perfectly comparable firm, to the one in question, 
but we are reluctant about using the P/E multiple directly to the valuation of our firm. Firm A 
is the comparable firm, with 2 million in expected earnings next year, cost of equity of 10%, 
and a market price of 40 million. This gives a forward P/E ratio of 20 (40 million market 
value of equity/2 million earnings). As noted, Firm A, and the company in question, Firm B, 
are similar, and Firm B is expected to generate 2 million of earnings as well next year. Both 
firms are of similar risk and 10% cost of equity is assumed for B as well. However, we are a 
little concerned about the growth rate of earnings, and have to use reverse engineering to find 
out what the market projects for the comparable firm, to find out if we agree, and then use the 
multiple to value Firm B. To illustrate this the simplest way, capitalized earnings is used: 

	  ?>
 
Where 
	 is the price of equity, year zero, ? is expected earnings next year, >
 is the 
cost of equity and E is the expected growth. Given the numbers we have for Firm A: 
40  20,1 
We solve this for g and get that g equals 5%. If one for instance assumes this estimate 
is too high for the firm in question, or to low, one will receive a different valuation, and a 
different P/E multiple. For instance, if firm A’s expected growth, by our estimations is 2,5%, 
approximately the expected inflation in Norway, we would get this price: 
     

	  20,1  0,025  26,67 
 
Which give a P/E ratio of approximately 13,33. Take note that the valuation method 
used to illustrate how one can infer the P/E ratio is simple, and lacking. One could easily 
argue for instance that a firm does not normally grow constantly, like this model assumes, but 
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it was only used to illustrate how one can double check what the P/E multiple implicitly is 
claiming. The P/E ratio and other multiples could be a result of different combinations of 
earnings, growth and cost of capital, but through different inverse engineering one at least 
gets a feel for the assumptions made by the market, and whether or not you trust them to 
apply to the company whose value is in question. 
 The valuation can as mentioned become circular if one does not pay attention. If you 
use the comparables of three firms to value the firm in question, you will ultimately get a 
value for this firm. The danger of circularity is if you use that value again, when valuing some 
of the firms you used as comparables. That is the problem with circularity, since the firm you 
used as a comparable basically is an input in its on valuation. This is not a problem in the 
private firm valuation since we don’t have a market price to begin with. 
    
 Three steps by Penman: 
 
Penman (2010) talks about three steps on how to use the method of comparables. “1) 
Identifying comparable firms that have operations similar to those of the target firm whose 
value is in question, 2) Identify measures for comparable firms in their financial statements- 
earnings, book value, sales, cash flow- and calculate multiples of these measures at which the 
firms trade and 3) Apply and average or median of these multiples to the corresponding 
measures for the target firm to get that firm’s value”(Penman,2010,pg 76). Although limited, 
there are ways to make the use of multiples more reliable than just using them blindly. First of 
let’s look at how to find and define firms of similar operations. 
 Implementation: Defining and finding comparable firms 
 
So the question is; what is a comparable firm? Damodaran(2002) defines it as one with 
cash flows, growth potential and risk similar to the firm being valued. In his definition there is 
nothing that forces the analyst to use only firms within the same sector or industry. This 
makes sense because the value of any given firm, is assumed to be dependent on cash flows 
(or earnings), growth and its risk. However the common implicit assumptions are that firms in 
the same industry share these characteristics, and hence the common practice is to use the 
firms from the same industry as comparables.   
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This of course is not necessarily true since businesses within the same industry might 
not even compete for the same customers, due to differences in products, and hence might not 
be equally affected by the changes in the market (systematic risk). An example could an IT 
firm that produces only high end business equipment versus a firm that produces low cost 
equipment for the private market. It is likely that the high end company will struggle more 
during a recession than the low cost company, and hence they would not have the same beta, 
or risk attached to the investment. In addition growth opportunities would likely also be 
different, so comparing their multiples would probably make the low end company seem 
reasonably priced, although that might be because of lower risk and lower growth and cash 
flow potential.  
There is basically no such thing as a two equal firms, and the comparables can only be 
as precise as the quality of input (the degree to which the firm’s are alike). This could be, 
according to Penman (2010) be negated by increasing the number of comps to average out the 
errors. In theory it will work but it is likely that the firms become less and less comparable, so 
the error will not be averaged out.  
 
 Implementation: Different multiples, different valuations 
 
The second problem with implementation is that different multiples give different 
valuations. With other valuation techniques, such as dividend discount model and discounted 
cash flow model, theory tells us that in principle, the price/value output of each model should 
be the same, given that one makes assumptions that are consistent across the 
border(Penman,2010). Given that the different comparables, like Price/earnings, Price/Book 
and Price/Sales give different answers, the problem becomes how to estimate the average of 
these, which one to chose. Arithmetic average, weighted average based on subjective 
assessment or other logical reasoning might be applied to find the “correct” output. Whatever 
the method used, it has to be logically chosen, so perhaps the more random arithmetic average 
is not suitable in most cases, unless the companies are equally similar to the firm’s whose 
value is in question. 
 Implementation: Negative denominators in the P/E ratio 
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The thirds implementation problem is that negative denominators can occur. This 
applies mostly to the price/earnings ratio. If there is a loss (negative earnings), the value itself 
would become negative, which makes little to no sense. This, will as Damodaran(2002) says 
lead to bias in the selection process of the firms used to compute the multiples. The firms with 
negative earnings are dropped out of the sample, and therefore, the firms left are likely to 
produce higher values of the price/earnings ratio than what is the “true” value for the sector of 
the firms chosen as comparable. This will, if not accounted for, likely produce a price that is 
too high for the firm whose value is in question. One solution to this, as presented by 
Damodaran(2002) is to aggregate all the net income’s and market value’s of equity, including 
those who had negative earnings, and compute and industry aggregate P/E ratio. Another 
multiple that might be better suited for sectors with firms having negative earnings is the price 
to revenue multiple. Having negative revenues is impossible, so the price/revenue multiple 
would ensure that at least there will be no upwardly biased estimate due the negative earnings 
firms being dropped out of the sample. Earnings are can as mentioned be affected by 
accounting rules and principles, and if comparing firms from different sectors, or perhaps 
even comparing public stocks with private stocks, the comparables might be flawed by this 
due to the differences in accounting rules and practices between public and private firms. In 
addition, to be discussed later, owners of private firms might intermix personal and business 
expenses, or charge higher/lower salaries, which will affect the earnings measure to be 
incorrect.  
  
Implementation: Consistency issue in the numerator/denominator 
 
The fourth potential implementation problem is the lack of consistency in the 
numerator and denominator in the multiples being used. Earnings per share, net income and 
book value of equity are examples of equity measures which should not me mixed with firms 
measures according to Damodaran(2002). Firms measures like operating income, 
EBITDA(Earnings before interest depreciation and amortization), mixed with the equity 
measures can potentially cause firms with different amounts of debt to seem cheaper/more 
expensive than they really are. An example of this could be shown through the price to 
earnings before interest depreciation and amortization multiple. Consider two completely 
equal firms, and the only difference being their difference in debt financing. Firm A and B 
both have 1 million dollars in EBITDA, however one has debt/equity ratio of 1, meanings its 
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operations are just as much financed by debt as equity. Given the fact that debt usually has a 
lower interest, and cost of capital, then equity, one could assume that financing with debt 
instead of equity would increase the earnings yield for equity, and hence generate a higher 
value, all else equal. However the well known theorem of Miller and Modigliani states that 
financing should not affect firm value, because the increased debt financing is exactly offset 
by increased risk for equity holders, and hence a higher cost of equity, causing the value to 
remain constant. Given that the theorem is correct, or/and that increased demand for debt 
forces the cost of interest to increase (as with any good that has limited supply when demand 
increases) the firm with more debt should not be valued differently, or misjudged to be cheap 
due to its debt financing.  
 Summary Method of comparables: 
  
The method of comparables is as discussed a potential trap, in lack of a better word. If 
not used without caution, one might end up with a very wrong valuation. The previous section 
might have indicated that the method is almost all bad, but that is not the case. Different 
ratio’s give different results, negative earnings cause the ratio to make no sense and the lack 
of fundamental anchoring are some of the issues that have been discussed. While this remains 
true, there is always a cost/benefit dilemma from the analyst’s point of view when choosing a 
valuation method. It serves a benchmark, to the very least, if one assures that the firms are 
comparable and that one uses the multiples correctly. In addition, when it comes to the 
valuation of private firms, it might be a valid method, considering the options. There are 
issues with illiquidity, the fact that it almost never trades, the value of control, difficult 
estimating a cost of capital and estimating the growth prospects, to mention a few potential 
issues, to be discussed later. The cost of taking all these into account might be so high that a 
relative valuation might serve its purpose greater than in the valuation of public firms.  
 Valuation Inputs: The Cost of capital 
 
 In this segment the different inputs of the cost of capital and the cost of equity will be 
discussed. First out is the tool itself, the capital asset pricing model.  
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 The Capital asset pricing model and the cost of capital:  
 
 Regardless of which valuation method one chooses to value a firm, with the exception 
of comparables, each method requires the computation or estimation of the cost of capital, or 
the required return. This could be the cost of equity if one chooses to value that, or the cost of 
operations (or firm) if one looks at the business as a whole. “The required return is the amount 
that an investors requires to compensate her for the time value of money tied up in the 
investment and for taking on risk in the investment”(Penman,2010,pg 110). A well known 
model in estimating the cost of capital for equity is the capital asset pricing model as 
presented by William Sharpe in 1964, for which he later won the Nobel Prize in economics in 
1990. The empirical evidence, the different ways to use it and the complexity of the model 
could be a master’s thesis on it’s own. This assignment will not go in depth, but rather scratch 
the surface and get a general idea of what the model consists of, how to use it normally and in 
addition, a discussion on how to use it on private firms.   
 The model looks like this: 
 ?!>W"  >+  XWY?!>Z"  >+[ 
 Where ?!>W" is the expected return on the asset I, >+ is the risk-free rate of return, XW 
is the beta of the asset i, ?!>Z" is the expect return on the market portfolio and the 
parenthesis Y?!>Z"  >+[ is referred to as the risk premium for investing in the market. 
 The expected return, can as Penman(2010) states, be seen upon as the amount of return 
the investor demands to compensate for the time value of money and for talking the risk of the 
investment. The risk of the investment, is dependent on the risk premium for the market as a 
whole Y?!>Z"  >+[ and the riskiness of the investment i, XW. The beta is a measure of 
systematic risk, which indicates to what degree the security moves with the market. As 
Penman(2010) says that CAPM assumes one can diversify away a considerable amount of 
risk away, and that the only risk left, that one is rewarded for taking on, is the systematic risk. 
Systematic risk is sometimes referred to as market risk, and in essence are risk factors that 
influences the market as a whole, and cannot be diversified away(Penman,2010). Factors like 
recession, interest rate changes, war etc has been named as potential systematic risk factors 
but CAPM is silent to what these systematic risk factors actually are(Penman,2010). If an 
investment has a beta of 1, it means that the investment is expected to move 1% in return, as 
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the market moves 1%. If it were 2, the investment moves in the same direction as the market, 
but with twice the magnitude. The beta formula looks like this(Penman,2010,pg 112): 
 ;@!7"  \]^_W^`ab !_b,c_` \` W,_b,c_` \` Z^_db,")^_W^`ab!_b,c_` \` Z^_db,"  
 Were beta of investment (i) is defined as the covariance between return on the 
investment I, and the market, divided by the variance in the return of the market. So in 
essence the beta of a security is a standardized measure on the variance on the return of the 
market. The beta is normally found by using a regression approach where one regress the 
changes in stock returns on the market returns.   
 The risk premiumY?!>Z"  >+[, can be found in a different way. The market index, 
the proxy for the market, is assumed to have a beta of 1. So one can find the risk premium by 
looking on the returns on the market index through a number of years. But Penman(2010) 
claims that research papers and texts have found this to be around 3 to 9,2 percent, so its 
perhaps not as reliable as one might think. The risk free interest on the other hand is easy to 
find, as it usually is found by looking at the yields of government bonds, which are assumed 
to be as close to risk free as possible. 
 The notion Penman(2010) provides, that the CAPM is not accurate, is also taken on in 
this thesis. Instead of reviewing large amounts of empirical evidence regarding the accuracy 
of the model, let’s look into the assumptions of the model, explaining why we can’t trust its 
results.  
 
 Assumptions of the capital asset pricing model: 
  
Since the capital asset pricing model is implying that the expected return of an 
investment is only dependent on the risk free rate of return, the systematic risk of the specific 
investment (beta) and the risk premium for investing in the market portfolio, there has to be 
some underlying assumptions supporting this. The assumptions mentioned by 
Damodaran(2002) are; there are no transaction cost, all assets are traded, investments are 
infinitely divisible, all market participants have the same information,  there exists a true 
riskless asset and that investors can lend and borrow at the riskless rate to achieve optimal 
allocations of their wealth according to their risk adversity. 
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 Assumption: No transaction cost 
  
The assumptions of no transaction cost, all have same information, all assets are 
traded, and that the investments are infinitely divisible relates to the fact that one can diversify 
away all firm-specific risk away without cost and that there is no expected excess returns over 
what the model dictates. For instance, if all investors have the same information and there is 
no cost in constructing a fully diversified portfolio, each investor can enjoy the full benefits of 
diversifying. In addition, the full information part means that no investor will be able to find 
assets that earn excess profits, above what the model stipulates. You gain return in relation to 
what systematic risk you are willing to undertake.  
 However, how realistic are these assumptions? First, the no transaction cost 
assumption does not hold, as we’ll see later on in the discussion of the bid-ask spread, which 
relates to transaction cost. Even in the most liquid stock markets, there is some transaction 
cost, even though technology has decreased it through time. If one looks in the real estate 
market instead, there are huge transaction costs which include broker commissions, and the 
time one spends selling the asset. With private firms, this assumption is especially weak. Like 
to be discussed, there is a significant liquidity discount that relates back to the transaction 
costs. 
 Assumption: All have same information 
 
The assumption that all have same information an assumption that probably doesn’t 
hold either. Public firms are obliged to give out information often, but there are probably still 
players in the market that has inside information and trades on it, although illegal. If one looks 
in other markets, like the real estate market, the assumption is probably weaker. A simple but 
dull example of this is to assume investors who live in an area probably has more knowledge 
of the potential growth than outside real estate investors. This assumption is especially weak 
when it comes to valuing private firms. A private firm, unlike public, does not have to 
disclose much information at all. This leaves a selected few individuals with more 
information than others.  
 Using real estate again, as an example, it is of course not possible to infinitely divide a 
share of real estate. This doesn’t hold perfectly for stocks either, even though one usually can 
acquire pretty small amounts. If one takes the eyes of a private firm investors, who considers 
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acquiring a company, than the divisible argument collapses. One buys the entire business (Or 
at least a number of shares), so the one is not able to purchase as small an amount as one 
perhaps could in a public stock company through mutual funds etc.    
 Assumption: All assets are traded 
 
The last assumption, all assets are traded, are also a bold one. One could perhaps argue 
that all assets to trade, at least in the very long run. Nevertheless, the fact that private firms, 
art, and real estate rarely trades, compared what the model suggests, has implications. When 
an asset rarely trades, how can one know that the current market price ensures that one only 
receives earnings according to systematic risk and the market premium? In addition, if the 
market proxy used to regress, one would expect there be a variation of returns unexplained 
due to the fact that the market proxy(usually the big stock exchanges) not to be the real 
market index, which is supposed to cover all assets.   
 To sum up, the assumptions are weak, at best, especially when considering private 
firm valuation. The CAPM has been discussed to not be accurate enough when it comes to 
public stocks, so it is therefore reason to believe it will be even worse when applied to private 
firms. As Penman(2010) says, there has been lots of efforts trying to build an asset pricing 
model that is accurate, but it has failed providing us evidence to what the cost of capital really 
is.   
Diversification:  
  
To illustrate how diversification works best, with regards to independent risk, or 
unsystematic risk, is perhaps by using the insurance example provided by Berk and 
DeMarzo(2007). Consider you have an insurance company, which covers insurance for theft 
and earthquakes. Again assume both events have equal probability of occurring(1%), and if 
they occur, the claims for each individual household will be by the same amount. Let’s say 
there are 100 000 households, which all buy one insurance policy for both theft and 
earthquake. Assume in addition that the distribution of thefts is to fall within 857 to 1125 
claims per year, leaving the insurance company forced to hold reserves worth of 11 25 claims. 
The expected claims for each incident is equal, due to the probability of both occurring being 
1% and the number of households being 100 000 (1000 claims expected). However, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that theft’s in one household is unrelated to (independent) to the 
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likelihood of theft in another home. On the other hand, an earthquake is likely to affect far 
more homes if it occurs. For simplicity’s sake, let’s assume the earthquake affects all 
households if it occurs. 
 These two incidents have what Berk and DeMarzo(2007) refers to as different sources 
of risk. An earthquake is a common risk, or systematic risk as called in elsewhere, as it affects 
all households. Theft on the other hand is independent risk, or unsystematic risk, since its 
likelihood of occurring is unrelated across households. Although not likely, the insurance 
company has to be prepared for the worst case scenario, when it comes to the risk of an 
earthquake, and has to have reserves covering all 100 000 claims, which it did not when it 
came to the thefts.   
 To relate this back to stocks and other portfolios of securities, think of the 100 000 
thefts and earthquake insurances as a portfolio of insurances. One portfolio (theft) has 
100 000 households where the risk of theft is completely independent, the portfolio regarding 
earthquake insurances however is a portfolio where each insurance shares the same risk 
exposure (systematic risk). In order to illustrate the difference in risk, I will calculate the 
standard deviation of the events occurring for both cases: 
 ef!ghij"  k@A!8@76" 
  k0,99!0  0,01"C  0,01!1  0,01"C  0,09949  9,95% 
 
 Where variance is calculated by the difference between the expected outcome of 
claims (0,01), and the claims in each outcome (0 and 1), squared, multiplied by their 
probability of occurring. For both cases, the standard deviation of an individual claim will as 
Berk and DeMarzo(2008) says be equal, however, the portfolio’s standard deviation, or risk 
for the insurance company will be different. They say:”When risks are independent and 
identical, the standard deviation of the average is known as the standard error, which declines 
with the square root of number of observations”(Berk and DeMarzo,2008,pg 301). Hence we 
get: 
 e!Am:@E fno 8@76p"  q*!`rW]Wrc^s s^WZt"kucZvb_ \+ \vtb_]^,W\`t 
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 9,95%√100000  0,03% 
 
 This example is a good way of showing what happens when the risks are completely 
independent, versus where they are not. In stocks or securities, usually there is no such thing 
as a security with only systematic or only unsystematic risk, like this example demonstrates. 
Under the assumptions of the example they are assuming thefts are completely independent 
whereas earthquake occurrence in a city is completely common, meaning they all will be 
affected by the same proportions. These are simplified assumptions to demonstrate the power 
of diversification. This example shows us the power of diversification which translates to 
normal valuation of stocks and securities, when you can buy funds or construct own 
portfolios, of companies with very different sources of independent risk. The only risk factor 
supposedly left, is the systematic one, the one that affects all companies. However in private 
firm valuation we don’t always have this luxury as we will discuss in the next segment.  
 Adjusting for nondiversification: 
  
Normally when applying beta technology, one is assuming the marginal investor is 
fully diversified. This however, might not be the case for a private firm investor. It is not 
unlikely that the investor has either his entire wealth, or a large degree of it invested in the 
private company. Damodaran(2002) argues that this might mean that the betas measured will 
understate the market risk exposure of such firms. 
 This can according to him be accounted for by estimating the total beta based on the 
market beta and correlation coefficient between the market index and the 
company(Damodaran,2002,pg 668): 
  j@Ax @  yzZ $ {z {Z|  
 Where yzZ is the correlation between the stock and the index, {z is the standard 
deviation of the stock and {Zis the standard deviation of the market 
index(Damodaran,2002,pg 668):  
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 j@Ax @/yzZ  {z {Z|  
 When you scale it like this, you get a relative standard deviation measure, since one is 
dividing the total(the stocks) deviation on the markets. Damodaran(2002,pg 668) refers to this 
as the total beta: 
f9@8 @  j@Ax @/yzZ 
 The market beta is then first found by comparing public firms in the same industries 
beta, and the estimate a correlation coefficient looking at the same sample. Damadaran(2002) 
argued that the market risk might be underexposed, but according to the formula, it seems 
more like some of the firm-specific risk inherent in the {z is included. Regardless of whether 
this approach is correct, there will be discussion later on if the inability to diversify should 
have expected returns to it. The method will not be used, due to the tedious nature of 
estimating a correlation coefficient based for the public firm or firms whom we choose as 
comparable.  
 
Beta estimation: Private firms 
 
If one chooses to trust the capital asset model, as a reliable tool for finding the cost of 
equity, one has to estimate the beta of the investment. As Damodaran says:” The standard 
process of estimating the beta in the capital asset pricing model involves running a regression 
of stock returns against market returns”(Damodaran,2002,pg 664). This however, is 
somewhat difficult to do when dealing with private firms as the lack past information in both 
quality and quantity, as an outside analyst. There are three other ways of estimating beta’s for 
private firms, presented by Damodaran(2002). These are accounting beta’s, fundamental 
beta’s and bottom up beta’s.  
Accounting betas:  
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Instead of regressing past returns for a security against the market index, one could use 
the accounting earnings as a substitute. The regression equation could then look like 
this(Damodaran,2002,pg 664): 
  
∆?@A:7:Ep_W]^,b +W_Z  @  ∆?@A:7:Epq&L		 
Where the slope of the regression would measure the sensitivity of changes in earnings 
with respect to systematic risk beta(b). As noted by Damodaran(2002) there are two severe 
limitations to this approach. The first limitation is that private firms usually don’t measure 
earnings on a quarterly basis, at least it’s not published as often as public firms, and the 
second is that earnings can be smoothed out to accounting judgments. In addition to not being 
measured on a quarterly basis, there are perhaps not many private firms with sufficient 
number of accounting years. The lack of quarterly measures and the number of accounting 
years affect the quantity of input and statistical power of the model whereas the second affects 
the reliability of the inputs (precision). Earnings could be a good measure if the rules of 
accounting were equal for private as well as public firms. Another problem with the measure 
is that it’s not a standardized measure. Should one use EBIDTA (Earnings before interest, 
depreciation, taxes and amortization) or Operating income or net income? It’s important to be 
aware of this, especially if one finds to challenge a private firm’s estimated beta with beta 
estimates provided by analysts who might have used a different method. Operating income or 
EBITDA would yield an unlevered beta, whereas net income would yield a levered beta, or 
equity beta. 
A possible solution if there is not enough accounting data or important accounting 
differences between the public and private firms, one could perhaps use fundamental betas 
instead. 
Fundamental Betas: 
 
Fundamental beta’s is a method of trying to relate the beta to observable variables like 
eanrings growth, debt ratios, variance in earnings, asset growth, etc. This was done by Beaver, 
Kettler and Scholes(1970), when they examined this relationship and used seven variables-
dividend payout, asset growth, leverage, liquidity, asset size, earnings variability and 
accounting beta. Damodaran(2002) mentions that Rosenberg and Guy(1976) also did a similar 
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analysis. Damodaran(2002) himself ran a regression in 1996 relating the betas of NYSE and 
AMEX stocks, with four variables; coefficient of variation in operating income, book 
debt/equity historical growth in earnings and the book value of total assets. The significance 
of each variable was not available in the book, but the regressions explanatory power was 
18%, and the outputs where(Damodaran,2002,pg 665): 
;@  0,65027  0,25  0,09?  0,54E  0,000009fh 
Where  was the coefficient of variation in operating income, D/E the debt to book 
ratio, g the growth in earnings and TA the book value of total assets. Needless to say, the R-
squared of 18% suggests not a strong model, but likely to have large standard errors. As 
Penman(2010) says no one really knows the true beta, as shown by empirical trials and errors, 
and if we in addition use a model that only has 18% explanatory power to predict this beta, 
there might be good reasons not to trust the result. Another way of estimating the beta of a 
private firm is the bottom up beta, also presented by Damodaran(2002). 
Bottom up betas: 
 
Bottom up betas is the method of using industry average beta’s for public firms, and 
uses that beta as representative for the private firm in question. Damodaran(2002) says the 
first obvious advantage of this method is that if one use the average of an industry, with a 
sufficient amount of firms in it, the averaging across large numbers of firms will decrease the 
standard error of the estimate. This benefit is transferred to private firms, and in that case one 
would use the average beta of and industry for publicly traded firms, and apply this to the 
private firm. As with the method of comparables, one has to make an assessment to which 
firms within an industry (if large) is most representable for the firms in question. This 
assessment will be looked into when applying the method for the case. To find the levered 
beta of the private firm one might run into a problem since there is no market value of the 
debt to equity ratio to be found. Damodaran(2002,pg 666) suggests the following solutions: 
1. Assume that the private firm’s market leverage will resemble the average for the 
industry. 
X_W]^,b +W_Z  Xc`sb]b_br1  !1  f@ A@"!i:pA @A@E /?7" 
Or  
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2) Use the private firm’s target debt-to-equity ratio (if management is willing to 
specify such a target) or its optimal debt ratio (if one can be estimated) to estimate the beta: 
X_W]^,b +W_Z  Xc`sb]b_br1  !1  f@ A@"!Fy76@8 /?7" 
In the first solution one is assuming the private firms leverage will resemble the 
average of the industry, and in example two one is assuming one could acquire a target or 
optimal debt ratio from the management and then calculate the beta of the private firm. 
 These three possible solutions to estimating a beta for a private firm will all be 
reviewed in the application part of the thesis. In addition to the special conundrum of 
calculating beta’s for private firms, the cost of debt might also be a challenge. 
Valuation Inputs: The cost of debt 
 The cost of debt 
  
In order to get from the cost of equity to the cost of capital, we need two other inputs; 
The cost of debt and the debt ratio. The cost of capital is also called the weighted average cost 
of capital, and is simply the market weights of both equity and debt, multiplied with the cost 
attached to them. This segment will review how we can estimate both the cost of debt and the 
debt ratio for private firms. The cost of debt is defined as;” the rate at which a firm can 
borrow money”(Damodaran,2002,pg 669).  According to Damodaran(2002) this is normally 
done with looking at the yields of bonds issued of public firms, or the ratings of these bonds 
to get a spread. With private firms usually don’t have this information, and they normally 
don’t issue bonds. This represents a challenge at which Damodaran(2002) notes three possible 
solutions. One is too use the interest rate of the most recent loan, number two is to assume 
industry average interest(given the firm is up for an initial public offering) and the third 
option is to use interest coverage ratios to estimate a synthetic rating and then estimate the 
interest rate from this rating.  
 To use the most recent loan interest as the input for the estimation of debt value 
definitely seems like the easiest one. However, it has to be current, since market value of debt 
by definition is current. Even if one could argue that a for example one year interest is not 
representative, it might still be used in this thesis due to the cost/benefit dilemma, given that 
that the case is just an example, not a precise valuation. 
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 If one is not satisfied with the degree to which the last debt was current, one could 
perhaps use the industry average interest rates. This is of course if the firm is being valued for 
an initial public offering. In addition if the firm was valued for transfer to a public company, 
this assumption wouldn’t seem so farfetched either. Then perhaps the most appropriate would 
be to use the current firms both debt ratio and interest rates as inputs. This is true because one 
can imagine that the firm would have little problems refinancing the loan if desirable. 
 The third solution presented is to use interest coverage ratio’s to estimate a synthetic 
bond rating and achieve an interest from this. The interest coverage ratio will provide a spread 
to which the interest deviates from the risk free interest. That way one can estimate the current 
cost of debt. This method will not be used in the assignment, because it is too time consuming 
to 1) Estimate the interest coverage ratio and  then 2) Find the interest coverage ratios and 
spreads of other firms.  
 Debt ratio: 
 
In addition to this, the debt-ratio is defined as the market value of debt, compared to 
the market value of equity. These are inputs which are not available for private firms, so we 
need to consider other options here as well.  Damodaran(2002) mentions four options; 1) Use 
industry average debt ratios 2) Use target debt ratios(if one is acquired) 3) Use optimal debt 
ratios or 4) Use the estimated values of equity and debt to estimate the debt ratio. 
The industry average debt ratio is used if these where used to estimate the beta, to 
achieve consistency in the estimation.  If the management of the firm provides a target debt 
ratio to the analyst, that is of course preferable, since one does not have to guess at what it is 
going to be/should be. The optimal debt ratio on the other hand is a theoretical estimate, at 
which one assumes there is debt ratio at which all of the EBIT are used to cover interest. This 
conundrum refers back to the question about whether or not there is such a thing as creating 
value with financing. This will not be discussed in this thesis, but it will be assumed for 
simplicity that Miller and Modigliani were right and that there is no optimal debt ratio in 
relation to value, and hence no effort will be used on estimating this measure.  
If using estimated values of the equity and debt to achieve the debt ratio one has to be 
aware that this estimation is circular. Because as he says;”You need the cost of capital(and the 
debt ratio) to estimate firm and equity value, and you need the equity value to estimate the 
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cost of capital”(Damodaran,2002,pg 671). Although flawed, one has to consider the 
consequences of effort/benefit, because there are undoubtly larger efforts in estimating these 
estimates for private firms, than there are for public ones. Simple might be better even if 
inaccurate.  
When the time of analysis comes, perhaps the easiest route will be taken on the cost of 
debt perspective. The reason being that some of these methods might not be especially more 
accurate than just estimating the cost of debt as the weighted average of all components of net 
financial obligations, as a method Penman(2010) described. The company in question is not in 
an industry that is directly relatable to the company’s on the OB stock market; hence their 
industry average might not provide much better estimate than their current book values of 
debt and recent interest payments. In addition the interest coverage ratio calculation is too 
tedious for this assignment. There will however be some sort of effort to find out what the 
firm can borrow at, currently. But due to its limited affect on the cost of capital, it will not be 
extensive. 
 Private firm essentials: 1)The illiquidity discount: 
  
A key difference between valuing private and highly traded public firms is the ability 
for the investor to change his portfolio/investments quickly, if desired. This lack of ability 
with private firm investment is related to a term called the liquidity discount. This is referred 
to by Damodaran(2005) as the cost of remorse, meaning that if one regrets an investment, one 
has to pay a percentage amount of the investment cost, to revert the decision. One can easily 
imagine that this “cost of remorse” varies with different assets. A highly traded public 
company for instance should be easier to sell quickly and with less cost, than an asset like for 
instance real estate. In this section it will be discussed how to measure the illiquidity discount, 
studies on its magnitude, different ways of finding it, how to apply it to valuation, and finally, 
how to apply it to private companies. Damodaran(2005) argues that liquidity is not a question 
of liquid or not, it is a continuum, meaning that all assets have varying degrees of liquidity 
attached to them. If one imagines two completely equal assets, where the only difference is 
the degree of liquidity, one would expect the most liquid asset to sell at the highest price. 
However, there is rarely such a thing as two equal assets in the market of stocks and 
companies, so one has to consider other ways of measuring illiquidity.  
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 Damodaran(2005) proposes transaction cost as a way of measuring illiquidity, and that 
higher transaction costs represents less liquid assets. He proposes three determinants of 
transaction costs which are; 1) Bid-ask spread 2) Price impact and 3) The opportunity cost of 
waiting. First to be discussed is the bid-ask spread:  
Bid-ask spread: 
  
If we accept the reasoning that transaction cost is a function of liquidity, the first 
component to look into is the bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread is the first component of the 
transaction costs to be discussed. It refers to the fact that there almost always is a difference 
between what a buyer will pay and what the seller receives, at the same point in time for the 
same asset, in almost every traded asset market(Damodaran,2005). There are three main 
arguments why there is such a difference, and these costs are called inventory rationale, 
processing cost argument and adverse selection by (Damodaran,2005). These all affect the 
market maker and incurring cost on the market maker. The market maker is the brokerage or 
bank that takes on the job of buying and selling securities at publicly quoted prices. 
 Inventory rationale:  
  
The market maker holds inventory for a specific stock or security in any point of time, 
hence needs to be rewarded for this. The risk as Damodaran(2005) mentions occurs if the 
market makers sets the price too high, or too low. For instance, if the price is too high it is 
likely that they won’t sell, accumulating inventory. On the other end, if the price is too low, it 
will result in a large short position in the stock(Damodaran,2005). In addition to this 
Damodaran(2005) mentions external (exchanges and regulatory agencies) and internal 
restraints(limited capital and risk) that in total makes up for the cost of inventory. 
  
 Processing cost argument: 
 
The second component of the bid-ask spread mentioned by Damodaran(2005) is the 
processing cost argument. This refers to the costs of processing orders such as the paperwork 
and fees connected to these. This of course is the minimum the spread has to cover, for the 
market maker to have profits.  
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Adverse selection problem: 
 
The third component is the adverse selection problem. Since the market maker is 
obliged to hold sell at his/hers quoted prices, there is a risk that he/she is trading with more 
informed investors than themselves (Damodaran,2005). As Damodaran(2005) says, this is a 
negative profit activity, and the spread needs to be large enough to on average cover these 
losses.  
 The magnitude of the spread: 
 
The studies reviewed in Damodaran(2005)’s paper, regarding the magnitude of the 
bid-ask spread will not be discussed in depth here. However there are some findings of 
interest(Damodaran,2005,pg 7);  
1) The spread in % of stock price is much higher for small capitalization companies compared to 
the large ones. 
2) The spreads on secure U.S. government securities are lower than on stocks in the U.S. market.  
3) Spreads on corporate bonds also tend to be larger than government bonds, and the safer more 
liquid bonds have less spreads than the riskier ones. 
4) There are also differences across markets, where non-us equity markets present higher spreads 
than the U.S.  
According to the theory, volatility should increase the spread; The cost of remorse will 
be larger if it is likely that the assets price is volatile. This can be partly attributed to the fact 
that it’s more difficult to find the right price (inventory rationale) with a more volatile 
security. This coincides with point 2 and 3, where stocks are apparently more risky than 
government bonds, and so are the corporate bonds.  
The difference in spreads across U.S. and non-U.S. equity market is attributed by 
Damodaran(2005) to the fact that these markets are less liquid and the firms traded have 
smaller market capitalization. 
The fact that lower market capitalization stocks have larger spreads in terms of % to 
price can be attributed to the fact that there will always processing costs of some magnitude, 
regardless of the size of the order/purchase. 
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A study made by Heflin, Shaw and Wild(2001) looked at the relationship between 
information disclosure quality and the size of the bid-ask spread. They found that the spread 
decreased as the information increased. This relates directly back to the adverse selection 
problem of the market maker, where less information is assumed to make them more 
vulnerable to informed traders. If most of the information is disclosed there will of course not 
be much room for more informed traders and the price will be easier to set. 
 
Determinants of the spread: 
 
There have been several studies on what the determinants of the bid-ask spread is, or at 
least which factors they correlate with. If possible, these should be consistent about the theory 
of why there exists such a spread in the first place, with the inventory rationale, adverse 
selection and the processing costs. 
Damodaran(2005) mentions studies that have found the spread to be correlated 
negatively with price level, volume, number of market makers but positively with volatility. 
The price level as mentioned relates to the processing cost argument as not all of these do not 
disappear though the stock doesn’t cost much, so a highly priced stock is assumed to have 
lower processing cost and hence transaction cost as a percentage of price. 
Volatility is likely to affect the adverse selection problem, since the more volatile a 
stock, the more potential benefit an informed investor will gain.  
The number of market makers will affect the competition between them. Like other 
markets, increased competition reduces profits. The bid-ask spread is there to ensure the 
market maker indeed has profits, so it’s not surprising that increasing number of market 
makers decreases the spread.  
Volume has a decreasing effect since it according to Damodaran(2005) reduces the 
need for the market makers to maintain inventory and increases the turnover of the inventory.  
According to the theory, the bid-ask spread increases with increased degree of adverse 
selection, meaning the risk the market maker have of trading with a more informed investor. 
This should then lead securities with more disclosed information to have smaller spreads, 
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since then the more informed investors would lose their advantage. As mentioned the study by 
Heflin,Shaw and Wild(2001) found that the spreads decrease as the information quality 
increases. Frost, Gordon and Hayes(2002) supports this view by looking across different 
equity markets and found that the markets the best disclosure systems had the highest 
liquidity. 
So to sum up, the bid-ask spread seems affected by volatility, information quality, 
number of market makers, and the price of the security. If the bid-ask spreads is a part of 
transaction cost, which we assume represents illiquidity cost, we could then assume to find 
consistent results when measuring the illiquidity discount later in this paper. 
     The cost of illiquidity: 
  
 As mentioned, the notion that an investor would pay less for an illiquid asset 
compared to another is neither unreasonable, nor unproven, given the empirical evidence 
presented earlier. Damodaran(2005) mentions three ways of examining the effect of illiquidity 
on the price of assets. First is by reducing the present value by the expected future transaction 
cost, the second by increasing the required rate of return, to reflect the cost of illiquidity and 
the third is to value illiquidity as an option. The option method refers to the fact that with an 
illiquid asset you lose the opportunity to sell at whichever time you wan’t, for instance when 
the asset is at its highest value, or in the profit zone for the investor. First let’s look into the 
future expected transaction cost.  
     Present value of expected future transaction cost. 
  
 The view of looking at the effect of illiquidity can be found be looking into the 
present value of all future transaction costs will not be reviewed in this thesis. The notion was, 
that in addition to calculating an intrinsic value based on future cash flows, one also has to 
consider the future transaction cost with the sale of the unit.  
 According to Amihud and Mendelson(1986), this and the fact that all future 
investors will consider these transaction costs, was the argument they proposed, and that the 
sum of these was illustrating differences in the illiquidity discount. The theory might be 
correct, if one accepts that transaction costs are strongly correlated with the illiquidity 
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discount. Nevertheless, to estimate and/or use it in valuation seems two tedious to elaborate 
further. 
      Illiquidity as an option: 
 
 The value of liquidity can be looked upon in several ways. One way is too look at is 
as the profits neglected from the fact that you were unable to sell at maximum profits. 
Longstaff(1995) used an approach where he considered an investor with perfect market 
timing, and estimated what the inability to sell at the top would result in terms of profits. He 
viewed as a look-back option, where the maximum price where the outer bound for liquidity. 
The notion that the cost of illiquidity is greater for more volatile assets and increases with 
time is supported. However, one could argue this approach is partly theoretical, since it is 
difficult to assess the skills of the investor and if the look-back price movements are 
representable for the future. In addition to this, one could easily imagine more volatile assets 
having a greater discount, making the option more valuable, as what other option theories 
suggest. His results where dependent on volatility and the longer time period, the bigger the 
discount.  
  
     Illiquidity and discount rates: 
  
 If one agrees that less liquid assets costs less than otherwise similar asset, the 
question then becomes, that one perhaps could view the cost of illiquidity similar to how risk 
is viewed in the capital asset pricing model. Risk is known to affect the price of assets. Two 
assets with equal expected returns but different risk are known to not be priced equally. Why 
would one pay the same for a more volatile asset if both had same expected returns?
 Following this notion Acharya and Pedersen (2003) established that illiquidity risk 
is related to expected returns. They found that illiquid stocks have higher risk premiums than 
liquid ones, and that 80% of this can be explained by the covariance of the stock’s illiquidity 
and the overall market liquidity. This method sounds a lot like the beta approach from asset 
pricing models, where the covariance of returns of a security to the market returns, explain 
differences in return across securities(beta). Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) found similar 
results where they claimed that returns sensitive to the market liquidity had higher annual 
returns (7,5%) than those with low sensitivity. In addition to this Amihud and Mendelson 
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(1989) examined adding bid-ask spreads to betas, to better explain the difference in returns 
across stocks in the US. They found that increase in bid-ask spread of 1% increased the 
annual expected return of 0,24-0,26%.  
 Without going into depth into these studies, they nevertheless seem to imply that 
liquidity, similar like risk, is something that affects expected returns and hence the price for 
what one pays for an asset. In addition the study by Acharya and Pedersen(2003) suggests that 
the beta of illiquidity risk matters, meaning that firms that are illiquid when the market is, 
should have higher expected returns. 
     Empirical evidence on the size of the discount:  
  
 If comfortable with the notion that less liquid assets trades at a discount, the next 
question becomes how big it is, on how it varies with asset classes. In this segment we will 
look into the studies from bonds, restricted stock and private placements and private equity. 
      Bonds: 
  
 In this segment we will briefly look into studies done on different types of bonds, 
with presumably different liquidity, and see whether or not they trade with discounts or not. 
The first study was done by Amihud and Mendelson (1991) that compared yields on treasury 
bills and treasury bonds with six months to maturity. They found that the less liquid treasury 
bond had an annualized yield 0,43% higher than the comparable treasury bills. A similar 
study was done by Kamara(1994), but according to Damodaran(2005), Strebulaev(2002) 
claimed that the tax treatment differences was the reason for the difference in yields. 
However, Chen, Lesmond and Wei(2005) compared the yields on more speculative corporate 
bonds and found the yield to vary with bond ratings(which is a measure of how risky it is) and 
with maturity. They found that liquidity decreases from higher to lower bond ratings and from 
short to long maturities. In regards to the riskiness of the bonds, a study made by Bianchi, 
C.,D.Hancock and L. Kawano (2004), concluded according to Damodaran(2005) that more 
illiquid bonds have higher default spreads than otherwise similar liquid bonds. 
 Although the liquidity issue was debated by Strebulaev(2002) in regards to t-bills 
and treasury bills, there seem to be enough studies supporting the fact that liquidity matters 
for the yield of the bonds. This is especially the case if one looks on to the study of corporate 
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bonds, which is more risky. According to the theory, the discount should be dependent on 
volatility, if one looks at the bid-ask spread. More volatile securities make the market maker 
more susceptible to adverse selection and the risk of trading with more informed investors.  
   
 
      Restricted stock and private placements:  
  
 Restricted stock studies are probably the most appropriate way of finding what is 
referred to as the illiquidity discount. The reason being is that restricted stocks are as 
Damodaran(2005) explains, stocks issued by public companies without the option of reselling 
for a period of time. In addition to this, only limited amounts can be sold after this holding 
period. This limitation reduces the price of the stock, and the reduction is viewed as discount 
for lack of liquidity. 
 A study by Maher(1976) examined restricted stock purchases made by four mutual 
funds in the period 1969-73. He found a discount in the magnitude of 35,43%. Another one 
conducted by Silber(1991) in the time span of 1981 to 1989 found a discount of 33,75%. 
These discounts seems rather large at first eyesight but a recent study from Johnson(1999) 
found a discount of 20%. 
 Given these magnitudes, should one assume that the proper discount for restricted 
stocks is in this range? According to Damodaran(2005) one should be skeptical about these 
results, due to three reasons.  
 The first refers to the fact that the sample sizes of the studies where small and 
spread over long time periods. The second is that the typical firms issuing restricted stocks are 
smaller, riskier and less healthy than the typical firm. The third and last reason mentioned by 
him is that investors involved may be providing services to the firm as well, justifying part of 
the discount.  
      Private equity: 
  
 In this thesis we are interested mainly in the illiquidity discount associated with the 
valuation of private firms. In that respect, looking into studies of private equity and venture 
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capital investors makes sense. A venture capitalist or private equity investor will of course 
know that their investment will not be as liquid as an investment in a public company. In that 
respect, they should implicitly discount the value they are willing to pay, to get “paid” for not 
having as liquid an asset. As discussed risk is something one gets compensation for in the 
capital asset pricing model, and if one gets compensated for less liquid assets, one would 
expect these to earn “excess” returns. What is meant here by excess returns is that it’s not 
really excess returns, but if not illiquidity is factored into valuation; it will appear as excess, 
even though you paid for it. 
 Ljundquist and Richardson(2003) did a study in that respect, estimating excess 
returns of 5 to 8% , compared to the public equity market. They attributed this excess return to 
compensation for illiquidity. However, as we know, there are more factors than just illiquidity 
that separate public from private firms. The fact that most investors probably are not 
diversified might count for some of the excess returns. In addition, if the private equity 
investors have some degree of control they might be able to influence the operations in a 
positive effect, earning an excess return. In summary, it is very difficult, if not impossible; to 
know what of this excess returns attributes to illiquidity and what is attributed to some degree 
of control or compensation for lack of diversification.    
 
    Dealing with illiquidity in valuation:  
 
 From the previous suggestion and empirical evidence, we can safely assume that 
liquidity matters for the value of an asset. The question is, how do we best apply this to 
valuation? One can according to Damodaran(2005) either value the business as liquid, and 
then apply the discount, adjust the discount rate to account for the illiquidity premium, or use 
relative valuation by using similar degree of liquid asset as comparables.  
      Illiquidity discounts on value: 
  
 In the capital asset pricing model, and other models to estimate the cost of capital, 
there is nothing that considers the cost of liquidity. One of the assumptions in many of these 
asset pricing models is that markets are efficient, there is no transaction cost and that there is 
full information and else well functioning markets. As previously discussed, this is not always 
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the case, especially with private firm valuation. So in order to value a private business one has 
to try to take this into account the fact that the asset is more difficult to trade, and hence apply 
a discount on the value. Damodaran(2005) describes four ways of estimating this discount. 
The first is to apply a fixed discount, second is a firm-specific discount based upon a firm’s 
characteristics, third a synthetic bid-ask spread and the fourth is an option based liquidity 
discount. Only the fixed discount and firm specific discount will be discussed in this thesis. 
      Fixed discount:  
  
 The simplest way of estimating the liquidity discount is to use a fixed discount 
based on the restricted stock studies noted earlier. However, as discussed, there is reason to 
believe, and empirical evidence supporting that the discount estimated from the restricted 
stock studies is perhaps inaccurate and to high.  Nevertheless, as noted by Damodaran(2005) 
this has been the standard practice for many analysts and in court cases regarding private 
company valuation. The range of this discount found by the restricted stock studies noted 
previously has been between 20-35%. However as noted, there where researchers who 
believed this discount was to large due to a sampling bias. In addition the studies suggest that 
the discount varies with information quality, volatility and time horizon of the investor.  
      Firm specific discount: 
  
 Knowing that the discount should vary across assets and business we need to 
consider the determinants of the discount, and how to implement them into deciding a firm 
specific discount.  
  
     Why should there be a liquidity discount? 
  
 There are several reasons why a less liquid asset, all else equal, should trade at a 
lower value than the liquid asset. One has the opportunity cost of waiting to sell, neglecting 
alternative investments, general need for liquidity and regretting once decision to purchase as 
a few examples. 
 The opportunity cost of waiting refers to the fact that if the investment has risen in 
value, but due to the lack of a liquid market, one bears a cost of not being able to make the 
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maximum profits. In the same ally, if the investors lays all or almost all his wealth into the 
investment, alternative investment opportunities might not be available. So in essence the cost 
of illiquidity can be traced back to the alternative cost of not investing in the best investment 
opportunities. This is of course related back to the “cost of remorse” term, since apparently, 
the decision to purchase the illiquid asset has to be viewed as the best opportunity for the 
investor, at the time of the investment. 
 On a general level though, one has the need for liquidity that varies with time and 
often unexpectedly. There might be personal reasons for the need for “cash”, or business 
reasons within the firm one has purchased, if it were a private business. Investment 
opportunities might arise, suppliers might tighten in the deals of trade, and if forced to sell 
shares of the business to cover these, there would definitely be a cost of illiquidity. There are 
different degrees of illiquidity within firms, and next we’ll discuss what factors affect the size 
of discount.  
    Determinants of illiquidity discount: 
  
 Damodaran(2005) sums up six determinants of the discounts which are; liquidity of 
assets owned by the firm, financial health and cash flows of the firm, possibility of going 
public in the future, size of the firm, the control component and the type of investor/buyer.  
 Liquidity of assets owned by the firm refers to the fact that a private firm that is 
difficult to sell should have lower discount attached to it if it consists of highly liquid assets. 
This is connected to the component that if liquidity needs arises, the investor could sell of the 
firms asset to cover these, even he/she cannot cover these by for instance selling shares of the 
company.  
 Financial health and cash flows of the firm is a factor too, but with slightly different 
implications. First off, normally a financial healthy company is a company that has matured 
somewhat, meaning that it is in cycle where it is not as volatile as for instance start-up 
companies with high growth potential. Hence a financial healthy company reduces the risk 
severe losses for the investor forced to hold on to an asset longer than he might prefer. In the 
public stock market, the shares could be for instance sold quickly if the stock price declines 
too much for the investors liking.   
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 Thirdly we have the possibility of the firm going public in the future. Regardless of 
what the need for liquidity is, if the firm is likely to go public, or in other words, easy to go 
public with, the investor is somewhat assured that if liquidity needs arises, this can be 
resolved by going public.  
 The size of the firm matters as well. If we, as Damodaran(2005) says, view the 
liquidity discount as a percent measure of the firms value, it is likely that the liquidity 
discount should be lower in that respect, with larger firms. This is tied to the fact that the 
transaction costs as a percentage of value, is less for these firms, as discussed previously.  
 The fifth determinant, the control component of the purchase is important too. If an 
investor gets the control of the company, he/she could easier liquidate the assets in the firm, if 
the need for liquidity arises. In addition, projects or investments with expected cash flows to 
arrive sooner rather than later would provide some insurance against the well “running dry”. 
 In addition to these, the type of investor that purchases the firm will also affect the 
illiquidity discount he/she attaches to the transaction. It is likely that different investors have 
different time aspects and different financial wealth, affecting the need for liquidity. One can 
easily imagine a very wealthy investor with long time horizon not being affected much by the 
fact that he/she is unable to sell the firm for a period of time. 
    Estimating a firm-specific discount: 
  
 Given that the research on the subject suggests that the liquidity discount varies 
across companies and types of securities, the question still remains, how do we estimate it for 
a specific company? If perhaps not completely accurate, the studies of the restricted stocks 
provided by Silber (1991) might give clues to what factors influence the size of the discount. 
         Restricted stock studies: 
  
 One of the most recent studies presented by Damodaran(2005) was the study made 
by Silber(1991). In addition to establish a median discount of 33,75%, Silber also examined 
factors that are supposed to explain the differences in discounts across the different restricted 
stocks. The regression model presented looked like this: 
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 Where; 
 RPRS= Restricted stock price/unrestricted stock pric=1-illiquditiy 
   REV= Revenues of the private firm (in millions of dollars) 
 RBRT= Restricted block relative to total common stock in % 
 DERN=1 if earnings area positive; 0 if earnings are negative. 
 DCUST=1 if there is a customer relationship with the investors;0 otherwise. 
 According to Silber(1991) each of the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant and the and that the f-test indicates the overall relationship is that as well, even 
though it is only 0,29%. To sum up positive earnings, revenues, and customer relationship 
with the investors reduce the illiquidity discount. However, the bigger the block sizes of the 
restricted stock in relation to total common stock, the lower the discount. The results are 
significant, meaning that one can safely assume that the discount is not static, across different 
variables, like the use of a fixed discount would imply. A study on restricted stock in 1991 is 
not valid for a private firm valuation in 2010, but at least we are neglecting the hypothesis that 
it is equal for all assets. 
     Summary: Illiquidity discount 
 
 There are several ways of viewing the illiquidity discount. This segment has tried to 
mostly illustrate the different approaches and magnitudes across assets. The bid-ask spread 
was a good place to start, in that it illustrates that even with so called liquid assets like stocks, 
there seems to be a discount attached to illiquidity there as well, if one views transaction cost 
as a part of illiquidity.  
 The cost of illiquidity was then viewed three different ways. The value of an option, 
that one cannot sell the security, a function of future transaction cost or its affect to the 
discount rates, in the respect that one has to be compensated for the lack of selling options.  
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 In addition we noticed that this discount varies with asset classes, which apparently 
can be attributed to the factors assumed to affect this discount. With regards to valuation, 
there seems to be a consensus that it varies with asset classes, in it varies within firm 
characteristics as shown by Silber(1991). Establishing that the discount is not fixed, does not 
necessarily mean that Silber’s approach will be used. The first reasons are that the study is 
somewhat old; the study is based on restricted stock, not private firms. The private equity 
study made by Ljundquist and Richardson(2003) were the most interesting one, in that respect 
that the difference in excess returns that in addition to illiquidity, partly can be attributed to 
lack of diversification. This part of the thesis has proven a complicated matter, and the point 
of this segment was to get an understanding of what the discount is how it varies with asset 
classes, and the factors/determinants it seems to vary with, and in theory should vary with.  
 There are several reasons why attaching a specific discount for illiquidity to a 
private firm is basically impossible. Strictly hypothetically, we would need two completely 
equal companies, whereas one was on the public stock market whereas the other where not. In 
addition to this, we would have to have data of private firm transactions, that could be 
measured up against the current market price of the public company at the exact same time. 
Even if such data were available, the differences in prices would not only be subject of the 
illiquidity discount. Part of it would be due to lack of diversification and part of it due to the 
value of control as to be discussed in the next segment. We could perhaps than try to adjust 
these results for coefficients like Silbers(1991) regression, but as noted that regression was 
not particularly strong and one would either way end up with potentially large standard errors. 
At the sight of it, it seems virtually impossible to get any good measure of this discount, at 
least as far as accuracy is concerned. This segment has proven it exists and is dependent on 
different factors, but due to the limited trust we can have in the output, and the fact that 
private firms are likely affected by other factors, a simpler solution will be applied. The next 
part, value of control, will also prove to be a somewhat cumbersome matter.  
   
Private firm essentials:2) Value of Control 
 
 When purchasing stocks or a significant share in a public company, it is normal that 
you don’t receive any significant control over the company. However, if one purchases a 
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private business, one receives full control over the company, given that you acquire enough 
shares. The question is, should full control over an asset yield a higher price to an otherwise 
similar asset? Houlihan Lokey Howard and Zukin did a control premium study, where they 
looked into the additional payment for controlling interest in relationship to minority interest. 
They came with the following statement:(Feldman,2005,pg 105) 
 A controlling interest is considered to have a greater value than a minority interest 
because of the purchaser’s ability to effect changes in the overall business structure and to 
influence business policies. 
  This value of control will depend on why the valuation is made, like the illiquidity 
discount, cost of capital and cost of debt. If you value the business to purchase the entire firm, 
you would gain the right to control the firm’s assets and operations. If the company is poorly 
run at the moment, and that you believe you could run it better and make larger profits, there 
is reason to believe you would value the business higher than what it’s current earnings and 
growth potential stipulates. In addition, the ability to control the assets might also reduce the 
illiquidity discount, as discussed previously. If one controls the assets, and there are sufficient 
amount of liquid assets and financial health in the company, any immediate liquidity needs 
can be covered, thus reducing the illiquidity discount attached to the investment.  Zukin and 
Howard mentioned five factors that will affect the magnitude of the value of 
control(Feldman,2005,pg 105): 
1. The nature and the magnitude of the non-operating assets. 
2. The nature and the magnitude of discretionary expenses. 
3. The perceived quality of existing management 
4. The nature and magnitude of business opportunities which are not currently being 
exploited. 
5. The ability to integrate the acquire into the acquirer’s buinsess or distribution 
channels. 
The first point, the nature and magnitude of the non-operating assets refers to assets 
are relevant to the cost of illiquidity. If a company has a high degree of financial assets that 
are highly liquid, one could imagine, that the acquirer of the firm has the ability to liquidate 
these if the need for liquidity arises. Hence these will be needed to be looked into if one tries 
to get a notion of how big the illiquidity discount is. 
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The discretionary expenses might have an impact on the value of control as well. 
Discretionary expenses are expenses that are either non-essential for the operations or 
expenses that are of redundant magnitude. Examples of these could be very expensive 
business parties, the CEO buying gifts for the family members on the firms account etc.  If 
there a lot of these, replacing the management and controlling these would undoubtly raise the 
earnings of the company and generating a higher value. This point however is related to the 
quality of the existing management. 
When talking about the quality of existing management there are a lot of factors that 
could be discussed. The ability to motive your workers, hiring skills, ability to find and 
evaluate profitable business opportunities, etc. This will of course be a subjective assessment, 
in which the analyst will need to know the business the company is in well, and the ability to 
evaluate how the business is run currently. The quality of management and unexploited 
business opportunities is integrated in Damodaran(2002) notion of the value of control. 
 
Damodaran(2002) stipulates an example of the value of control by considering what 
the firms is worth with optimal management, the value of the current management and the 
value of the controlling interest.  The optimal management value is ultimately dependent on 
the opportunities that are not being exploited. It is also related to the expense controlled, an 
example being the discretionary expenses mentioned by Zukin and Howard.  The following 
example is from Damodaran(2002,pg 685). 
 Let’s imagine we have a firm that is worth 100 million with the current management, 
and 150 million with optimal management. You can either buy 51% of the company or 
achieve full control or 49% of the company, leaving the other 51% to a single individual, 
which then leaves you with no control basically over the company. He computes the value 
like this: 
 Value of controlling interest= 51% of optimal value= 0,51*150= 76,5 million 
 Value of noncontrolling int= 49% of status quo value=0,49*100= 49 million 
 At status quo the company is worth 100 million, and each % is hence worth 1 million. 
However if able to change it with 51% of the shares, each % of the shares increases its value 
of 1,5 million, meaning that 51% of the shares is worth 51*1,5=76,5 million. The difference 
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between the two percent is massive, and this is because the value when run optimally is 50% 
higher. This is perhaps an overstatement if how it normally is, but illustrates the potential 
value of control. Damodaran(2002) states that if a firm is run optimally there will be close to 
zero value of control. However, as mentioned, perhaps there is reason to believe that the 
ability to liquidate assets when there is a need for liquidity, reduces the illiquidity discount, 
and hence increases the value, even if the firm is run optimally. 
 As Zukin and Howard claims, the magnitude of the control premium  is dependent on 
the nature of the business opportunities. This is logically as one can imagine that the value of 
control in a stable industry with low growth prospects is low. There simply is not much to 
gain from running the business optimally in terms of the right investments. Hence, studies that 
might indicate how much companies rise in value after being acquired, and replaced with new 
management, will not be precise.  
The value of control ultimately is difficult, if not impossible to measure. To do so 
correctly, one would have to have the current value of company, and the value once acquired 
and run optimally. For a company to be run optimally is a theoretical matter, since there will 
always be opportunities that most people cannot see. In addition the discretionary expenses 
and non operating assets might also be difficult to measure. Private firms are known for not 
disclosing much information, so for the outside investor these might be difficult to estimate. 
So even to begin to asses a situation of a firm, to get a proxy of how much the firm is worth, 
run optimally, is a task that cannot be done with accuracy.  
 The original idea was to investigate the matter thoroughly, but it appears to be as 
noted, a process that has higher costs than it has benefits. Instead, the recommendation is to 
look into each business individually, when trying to estimate the value of control.  
Theoretically the value of the control will be dependent on the factors mentioned above. The 
effect these have on the perceived value is uncertain, but logically it still makes a difference. 
If there is sufficient information, ideally one would consider each factor, but to get anything 
other than a guess on the value of control is unlikely.   
 A final note, the theory regarding Howard and Zukin were found in the book 
Principles of Private firm valuation, by Stanley J.Feldman(2005,pg 105). However, his 
method of citation was poor and the study and the original work has not been found. This is of 
course a flaw, but the theory itself makes sense, and since no empirical evidence was 
presented, but mere theory, it was kept in the assignment.  
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 Private firm essentials:3) Accounting standards and 
discretionary expenses: 
  
 
 Among the potential differences between private and public firms, we have the 
accounting standards that might affect the valuation process. In addition to this, there are 
possibly discretionary and intermixing of personal and business expenses that are sometimes 
common in private firms.  
 The reason for this potential accounting standard problem, is that public firms are 
governed under strict accounting standards, whereas private firms, especially if not 
incorporated, might operate under far looser standards(Damodaran,2002). The implication of 
this in valuation is that one might not get the correct earnings numbers out of the private firm 
reported statements. This again will make it difficult to compare private firm’s earnings 
across each other, or for instance use comparables based on public companies, to value 
private firms. This thesis will not go into depth at all; just mention that there might be a 
potential problem, which one has to be aware of. So when one goes through the financial 
statements one has to keep an open eye for items that might have been tampered with.  
 Another potential issue that might affect the reported earnings is the intermixing of 
personal and business expense. Often in private firms, the owner is also the manager or CEO. 
This can potential create problems. The reason being according to Damodaran(2002) is that 
the owner might intermix personal and business expenses. An example might be a car bought 
on the company’s account, which is used privately. Another might be computer equipment 
bought for personal use, but written off as a business expense in the financial statements, 
lowering the reported earnings. If that happens, it might be difficult to get an idea what the 
true earnings and growth potential of the firm really is. Needless to say, this can be difficult 
for an outside analyst to discover, but before an eventual takeover one should perhaps demand 
an elaborate description of the reported income statement to accommodate this. 
 The thirds potential issue mentioned by Damodaran(2002) is the failure to separate 
management salary and dividends. In a private firm, the management salary might be 
overstated, due to the fact that he/she might be indifferent to in which form the compensation 
comes in.  
64 
 
 These issues are hard to investigate for the outside analyst, considering the lack of 
information provided by private firms, and will not be pursued in this thesis. They were only 
presented to illustrate a potential problem, and make aware of the extra caution needed when 
viewing the financial statements. 
 
 Private firm essentials :4)Valuation Motive:  
  
What is the reason for which the valuation is made? Initial public offering, value for 
transfer to employees, sale to private entity might or sale to a public company might all have 
different implications on the valuation.  The illiquidity discount, adjusted beta,  tax rate, firm 
life and illiquidity discount are all factors that separate private company valuation from 
regular valuation. However, to the degree they should be factored in will vary with the reason 
for which the valuation is made. In this thesis we will briefly look into the consequences if the 
valuation is made for an initial public offering, sale to a private entity or to a publicly traded 
firm.  
 If valued for an initial public offering, the company should of course be valued as if it 
were a public company, and not a private one, since that is the purpose of the initial public 
offering. The illiquidity discount should be approximately zero if the company is entering a 
highly traded market, however there might still be exceptions. Even though public, if the 
company in question is a small company, compared to the others on the index, one might, as 
proved by studies, argue that there still will be a liquidity discount. This is perhaps nitpicking, 
but as discussed before, the question is not liquidity or no liquidity; it is a matter of a 
continuum. If valued for sale to a private investor or entity, Damodaran(2002) argues that the 
degree of illiquidity discount should be estimated taking the investor in question into hand. If 
the investor is wealthy, has a long time horizon for his horizon and has no immediate needs of 
liquidity, one could argue that the illiquidity discount should be lower. On the other hand, an 
investor who puts almost all his wealth into a private company, and is financially very 
dependent on the success of this firm, is likely to attach a higher illiquidity discount, making 
the price he is willing to pay, decrease.  
 In addition to the liquidity needs, the amount of diversification the investor has will 
according to Damodaran(2002) affect the discount rate attached to the investment. In CAPM 
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assumptions, one is as mentioned assuming that due to the ability to diversify away 
unsystematic (firm specific risk), one does not get a return premium for holding such risks. 
However, Damodaran(2002) argues that since one is unable to diversify as an investor of a 
private company, one should be rewarded with additional return, increasing the beta. This 
beta adjustment will according to him rely on the degree of diversification of the investor in 
question. If the purchaser of the company on the other hand is public company, the added risk 
to the public company will depend upon the company’s degree of diversification and the 
correlation of risk to the private company in which they will purchase, like normal portfolio 
theory. In addition, Damodaran(2002) mentions possible synergy effect with costs and 
revenues, if sold to a public company. If the combined units function betters than separate, 
there might actually be a value increase, relating to selling to going public.  
 The cost of debt is also as discussed likely to be affected by the reason for which the 
company is valued. For a private firm the interest payment is normally not current and hence 
not accurate as the cost of debt. Interest coverage ratio’s, industry average interests and most 
recent loan interest was discussed as possibilities to negate this. If the firm is valued for an 
initial public offering the most appropriate seems to use the industry average (public) as 
representative for the firm in question. On the other hand, if valued for private sale, perhaps 
the interest coverage ratio or the most recent loan interest is more suitable.  
 Private firm essentials: 5)Forecast horizon 
  
When valuing private firms, with the models shown previously in this paper, one 
usually assumes infinite lives and time horizons. This however, might be different with 
private firms. Many private firms have family owners and managers, what happens when 
these pass on? The company might then be liquidated, if one cannot find a successor. As 
Damodaran(2002), the transition to a new CEO through family is sometimes difficult and the 
owner might not want to pass over the control to an outsider. This implication might affect 
both the growth prospects and the assumption of infinite time horizon on valuation. For 
instance, is it likely to assume a constant growth rate in residual earnings over an infinite 
horizon if 1) The owner/CEO is old and has few successors, and 2) That the company in 
general is assumed to last forever? In mathematical terms, forever is not a very long time. For 
instance, 1000 dollars today, expected to grow at 2,5% for 30 years, discounted with a 10% 
cost of capital is only worth approximately 120 dollars. In that respect, the error of infinite 
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lifespan grows smaller the further one goes past for instance 30 years. Nevertheless, this has a 
potential impact on valuation, if one expects is uncertain of the firm’s ability to replace the 
CEO in the near future. However, as Damodaran(2002) mentions, there are plenty of private 
firms, often the larger ones, that are run like public firms, with a professional CEO, that the 
assumption of infinite growth and lifespan can be retained. 
 
 Application: Case Sorlandschips AS 
 Sørlandchips AS : Introduction:  
 
 Sørlandschips AS is a private company located south in Norway in Kristiansand. The 
company is somewhat special in that it markets itself as Norway’s smallest chips factory. It 
was founded somewhere around 1990 and have grown substantially since then, with currently 
distributing in most cities of Norway. The chips itself is produced by a special technique, 
keeping the potato shell on when frying it in peanut oil. In addition the potato flakes are 
thicker than normal potato chips. As you can see from the financial statements the company 
has enjoyed substantial revenue growth from the limited amount of accounting data available 
online. The company enjoys somewhat of a recognized brand with national television 
commercials contributing to that. Not much relevant information was drawn out from the 
somewhat uninformative web-site the companies have, with loading times for each segment, 
and the outlay of the website being more art than informational. So the following valuation 
attempt is basically based upon the financial statements and some simplified assumptions. 
 Forecast horizon and valuation motive: 
  
Before we proceed to the calculation of beta and the cost of capital, lets remind 
ourselves the theoretical part on forecast horizon and valuation motive.  
 As discussed the forecast horizon might be different with private firms, given that one 
is not sure if the company can have CEO’s to succeed after the current retires. Although a 
potential private company issue, in this case we will for simplicity sake assume we can 
calculate continuing value like with public firms.  
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 Diversification, value of control, cost of debt, cost of equity and illiquidity discount 
are all measures affected by the reason for which the valuation is made, as discussed 
previously. In theory the assumption of this thesis will be that the investor is a private investor 
trying to evaluate what he/she finds Sørlandchips AS value to be, from an outside point of 
view.  This investors approach, will be of one that gives a hunch for the value, not a precise 
estimate, since this seems almost impossible, as part of the discussion before has shown, and 
as the case illustration might further elaborate. In all cases the benefit/cost  dilemma will 
decide which approach is chosen.   
 Beta and the cost of capital: 
 
The models intended for use in this thesis is the residual earnings model and the 
method of comparables. For the residual earnings model we will need the cost of equity first, 
based on beta technology. As previously discussed we don’t have the input needed to estimate 
the beta in a normal way, where we would regress the returns on the market on the returns on 
the security. For private firms we discussed three other options which where; Accounting 
beta’s, fundamental beta’s and bottom-up beta estimation.  
 Accounting beta’s relies on regressing the earnings against the market index, instead 
of the returns. However, as with any regression approach this demands a significant amount 
of data. For the case at hand, there were only 3 years of accounting data available, from 2006-
2008. The first problem is of course that this is by no means of the imagination sufficient data 
to run a regression with any significant results. The second is that we might not, as discussed, 
be 100% certain about the earnings number in a private firm, vs a public, as the rules might 
differ, and the potential discretionary expenses discussed previously.  
 Another way of estimating the beta of a private firm is the fundamental beta solution. 
This refers to estimating the beta coefficient by looking at regressional models that tie the beta 
into fundamental observable factors, which we also can find in private firms. As mentioned 
Damodaran(2002) ran a regression trying to deal with this and get the following model; 
  
;@  0,65027  0,25  0,09?  0,54E  0,000009fh 
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 Where  was the coefficient of variation in operating income, D/E the debt to book 
ratio, g the growth in earnings and TA the book value of total assets? The model’s R-square 
was 18% which suggests a very weak model, with little explanatory power and potential large 
standard errors. Normally this would be a model to weak to use, but since there is such limited 
information with regards to private firms, let’s at least illustrate how its computed. To use this 
method, the factors involved where calculated and looked like this:  
  
 The coefficient of the variation in operating income (0,14) is as mentioned previously 
in this thesis the standard deviation of operating income divided by the mean operating 
income. This is done on only three years, and is likely not a reliable output. The debt/equity 
book ratio was 3,23, total assets in dollar values was approximately 8,9 million, and the 
growth rate 0%. In reality the growth rate was not 0%. It was negative 35,48% in 2007 and 
positive 4,7% in 2008. However, based on only two years of growth, it is impossible to say 
anything about this growth rate in earnings. For simplicity sake, just assume it is 0%.  
 Based on the outputs we get this beta: 
   
;@  0,65027  0,25  0,14  0,09  3,23  0,54  0  0,000009  8,987333,33
 0,98 
 As mentioned this estimate is not to be trusted by far, first off due to the low R-
squared. Second, this regression is based on stocks in the United States, and might therefore 
not be correct for a company in Norway. Beta is found by regressing returns on stocks, and 
what causes returns in U.S to vary might not be the same macro factors that cause returns to 
vary in Norway, although there are of course some sources that have much of the same effect. 
A recent example is the worldwide recession, affecting both countries stock indexes. Given 
that the regression is so weak, and based on another country, it will probably not be used in 
this thesis. If one perhaps could do the same in Norway with better explanatory power, it 
might be more appropriate. Perhaps the Bottom-up beta’s are more appropriate.  
 
CV_OI 0,14
D/E(book) 3,23
g (earn) 0,00
TA(total assets) 8987333,33
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 Bottom up beta’s 
  
The method of using bottom-up beta’s refers to using an industry unlevered betas as an 
estimation for a private firm. To do this properly one needs to define what a comparable firm 
is first, in order to get beta’s that are comparable. Sørlandschips AS is a company that mainly 
gets their revenues from selling snacks. On the OBSE(Oslo Børs Stock Exhange) there are no 
companies within the exact same business, unfortunately. If we define the snacks as a food 
industry, we get a different picture. Below is the beta’s collected from www.dn.no for the 
following companies: 
  
 Apart from Rieber and Son and Ekornes, all these companies are companies which 
mainly produce/develop some sort of fish products, which is a very big industry in Norway. 
The question then becomes, are these beta’s valid for a company who gets their revenues from 
selling snacks?  In essence we don’t really know exactly what affects the betas, so the task of 
determining whether or not these firms are affected by the same systematic risk factors is a 
difficult one. Norway is known for their lumber, oil/energy companies and fish companies. In 
that respect one would believe the marked index to move due to systematic risk factors 
affecting these companies. This is the reason why it’s chosen not use their betas as an estimate 
for Sørlandschips, because the comparable firms are not really comparable. Rieber and Son at 
least is a company at which gains most of its revenues from food products, sold in the same 
grocery stores as Sørlandschips, and is the closest we got to a comparable firm. Only one 
comparable firm for the beta estimation is extremely uncertain, but rather than trusting this 
estimate, we will use sensitivity analysis later, to see how critical this uncertainty has on 
value. 
 For 2009 Rieber and Son’s D/E ratio was 0,4915, and assuming a marginal tax rate of 
28% we can calculate the unlevered beta for this company: 
Betas
Aker Seafoods 0,4726
Ekornes 0,1759
Cermaq 0,4823
Codfarmers 0,7624
Copeinca 0,4848
Domstein 0,2794
Lerøy seafood 0,2302
Rieber and Son 0,1745
Average Beta 0,3827625
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 :8A @vctW`btt  	,O3LD!	,CK"!	,3L"  0,1289  
 This beta estimation seems very low at first sight. However, as discussed, perhaps the 
systematic risk factors affecting the index have very little effect on a business that sells a 
variety of food products, as opposed to fish which is a main export source. The unlevered beta 
of 0,1289 will be a starting point for the further estimation of the cost of capital, although it is 
an highly uncertain measure. The beta estimated by the fundamental beta approach will not be 
used because it is too far off the beta’s collected for the industry, and it was based on a very 
weak regression based on other stock markets.  
The main question then is; Can we justify that Sørlandschips AS is not affected by 
interest changes, recession, booms, currency fluctuations etc as much as for instance Statoil or 
Hydro? It is not unjustifiable that a snack company, with regards to factors affecting the 
national economy, is relatively protected. Hence there is reason to believe that the beta in that 
case is in the low region. But is it a certain measure? Not by any stretch of the imagination. 
This is one of the many problems with private firm valuation, when you have no real 
comparable firms and in addition lack of information, forcing the analyst to basically make a 
wild guess. The bottom up beta is definitely not an ideal solution with only one company to 
compare with, but due to the lack of information and the poor regression model for 
accounting betas, it’s the best we got.  
  
 
The marked risk premium: 
 
 In the section where the Capital Asset Pricing model where discussed, it was found 
that the market risk premium had been found between ranges of 3 to 9,2 percent. This is a 
wide margin and based on foreign stock exchanges. From the governments website 
www.regjeringen.no, segment 9.7 the market risk price on the OBSE was found to be 
approximately 6% during the last 28 years by Johnsen(1996). He argued that the modernizing 
of the stock exchange from 1985 and the increase of foreign investor should make the risk 
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premium lower, and he concludes with a risk premium of 5 percent. Whether or not he is 
right, is not that important, it is probably a better estimate than those based on foreign 
exchanges.  
 The risk free interest: 
  
On the web-page www.norges-bank.no, the yields on government bonds from 7th of 
may was found to be 2,06% for 3 years to maturity, 2,40% 5 years and 4,19% for those with 
10 years to maturity. Since we are valuing a private firm, with an investor who is likely to 
have a much longer time horizon than your common stock investor, it seems reasonable to use 
to yield of the 10 year government bond as the input for the risk free interest.  
 Adjusting for non-diversification:  
  
There was previously a discussion that argued that since most private investors are not 
diversified, as one assumes when using beta technology, that the beta and risk should be 
adjusted accordingly. The solution presented earlier was to estimate the correlation coefficient 
between the market index and the market beta for the security at which one has chosen as 
comparable. Since we don’t have certainty in the company chosen even being comparable, 
and the fact that one has to compute the correlation coefficient, this seems like a solution not 
worth pursuing.  Although sound in theory, rather than doing this, a premium will be added 
for this lack of diversification, based on excess returns observed in studies discussed 
previously in this paper.   
 Estimating the cost of equity: 
 
With the unlevered Beta of 0,1289 from Rieber and Son, the next question is what 
debt/equity ratio Sørlandschips will attain. One could use the book values of debt and equity 
to calculate them, however Damodaran(2002) suggests other options as discussed previously. 
We discussed four other options to get from the levered beta to the unlevered, which where 
optimal debt ratio, target debt ratio, industry average or use the estimated values of equity and 
debt to estimate the ratio. Since the industry is not comparable the industry average solution is 
not preferable, a target debt ratio is not acquired and the estimation of debt and equity values 
will become circular. The optimal debt ratio will not be estimated because it is beyond the 
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scope of the thesis. We could perhaps use the debt/ratio of Rieber and Son, or use the book 
values, let’s look at the differences in betas, ranging from 0,4915 to 3,23(the book value ratio) 
 
These beta values will be the range of which we will estimate a range for cost of 
equity’s a little later on. It’s definitely not perfect, but with private firm valuation puts serious 
limitations on the analyst, as far as the cost/benefit of doing estimations that in theory are 
more accurate. In this case the unlevered beta is assumed correct, or appropriate, and flexed 
with various degrees of D/E ratios. In reality the book D/E ratio is probably way too high, and 
there could probably be a range for the unlevered beta as well, but even though the potential 
method seems flawed, the range from 0,17 to 0,43 doesn’t seem to farfetched concerning the 
nature of operations.  
Now that we have the inputs needed for the cost of equity, lets recall the equation 
CAPM provides: 
?!>W"  >+  XWY?!>Z"  >+[ 
 With risk free interest of 4,19%, market risk premium of 5% and a levered beta of 0,17 
we get the following cost of equity for Sørlandschips: 
  
?!>W"  4,19%  0,175%  4,8345% 
 At first eyesight this seems way too low. Let see what happens to the cost of equity if 
we do a short sensitivity analysis on the beta’s size. 
  
Unlevered beta D/E Beta(levered)
0,1289 0,4915 0,17
1 0,22
1,5 0,27
2 0,31
2,5 0,36
3,23 0,43
Beta sørlandschips Risk free interest Risk premium Cost of equity
0,17 4,19 5 5,04
0,235 4,19 5 5,365
0,3 4,19 5 5,69
0,365 4,19 5 6,015
0,43 4,19 5 6,34
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  With beta’s ranging from 0,17 to 0,43 (assuming we believe it is in the low end, due t 
the nature of operations), we get cost of equity’s ranging from 5,04% to 6,34%. Later on we 
will use these estimates to see how sensitive the valuation is on the cost of equity estimates 
here. Now before we proceed, recall that Ljundquist and Richardson(2003) did a study on 
private equity that found excess returns of 5 to 8%, which they attributed to a compensation 
for illiquidity. However, lack of diversification and a potential value of control are also 
factors that might affect these excess returns. Therefore, let’s leave the cost of equity as it is 
for now, and return to it when we try to implement the cost of illiquidity and the value of 
control.  
 Estimating the cost of debt: 
  
Now that we have the cost of equity, the next step is to calculate the cost of debt, 
before applying the weighted average cost of capital equation to get to the cost of capital. As 
previously discussed we could either 1) Use the most recent loan interest, 2) Calculate interest 
coverage ratios or 3) Use industry average interest rates. Since there is very little information 
available, but the financial statements, it is not possible to find the most recent loan’s interest. 
The industry average is neither preferable since as discussed, the industry on the stock market 
exchange really isn’t the same industry as Sørlandschips AS is in. The interest coverage 
ratio’s will neither be used, because as discussed it is too time consuming. There is no 
guarantee that those would apply for private firms. From a banks perspective, two firms of 
similar financial health and size should not be rated the same. The reason is that a public firm 
can easier raise new cash if needed, opposed to a private firm. The last potential solution then 
is to estimate the current interest expense based on the financial statements. 
 Given that the cost of debt is the interest at which the company can borrow, the most 
reasonable thing seems to calculate the financial expense in relationship financial obligations, 
instead of net financial expense compared to net financial obligations. Below are the 
calculated numbers.  
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 Here we have taken total financial expense and divided it by total financial liabilities, 
to get an estimation for the cost of debt. The years 2007 and 2006 seems at first eyesight to be 
an exception. In those years there where mainly short term debt financing, which naturally 
leads to higher financial expense, then with long term debt. We will take the 5,3% as an 
estimation for the cost of debt, as it does not seems like an unreasonable number.  
 Given the 28% corporate tax rate the cost of debt after tax is=5,3%(1-0,28)=3,816%. 
 With the cost of debt at hand, we need the debt ratio before proceeding to the 
calculation of the weighted average cost of capital. 
  Debt ratio  
 
As with the calculation of leveraged beta, we need to make the same assumptions here. 
For discussion on how to find the debt ratio, please look back to that segment. The debt ratio’s 
discussed ranged from 0,4195 to 3,23, which was the comparable firm Rieber and Son vs the 
book value ratio. As an example, let’s see what happens to the weighted average cost of 
capital with both outer limits. 
The weighted average cost of capital formula looks like this: 
>a  >
  ??    !1  f" 

?  >* 
Where P 

D*Q is the weighted amount of equity, P
*

D*Q the weighted amount of debt, 
>
 the cost of equity, !1  f" the reduction of the cost of debt due to taxes and >* is the cost 
of debt, before taxes. If you recall the cost of equity with the beta based on Rieber and Son’s 
beta where 5,04% with a D/E ratio of 0,4915. And the estimation of the cost of debt of 5,3% 
calculated from the financial statements. When the D/E ratio is 0,4915, that is the same as 
Financial expense 2008 2007 2006
Sum annen rentekostnad 0 14 000 0
Sum annen finanskostnad 1 227 000 964 000 134 000
Total financial expense 1 227 000 978 000 134 000
Financial liabilities
Other long term debt 15 516 000 0 0
Other short term debt 7 632 000 9 391 000 1 401 000
Total financial liabilities 23 148 000 9 391 000 1 401 000
Net financial obligations (NFO) -22 264 000 -8 890 000 4 804 000
Financial cost/Financial obligations: 5,30 % 10,41 % 9,56 %
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writing that D(0,4915)/E(1), hence the P *
D*Q  P
	,3L
D	,3LQ  0,33, and similar, the E/(E+D) 
ratio becomes D	,3L  0,67. So that gives us: 
  
>a  5,04!0,67"  !1  0,28"!0,33"5,3  4,636 
 
 So with debt/equity of 0,4915 and the following leveraged beta we get 4,636% as the 
cost of capital. What if we go to the other spectrum? With 3,23 D/E ratio we get a D/(E+D) of 
0,7635 and a E/(E+D) of 0,2364. And the cost of equity was 6,34%. This gives us; 
   
>a  6,34!0,2364"  !1  0,28"!0,7635"5,3  4,412 
 So basically, in the two ends of the spectrum we get a cost of capital in the range of 
4,636% to 4,412%. This is a tight range, but it does not have to be correct. As discussed in the 
theoretical part, illiquidity, value of control and lack of diversification are all factors that 
might affect the expected returns and hence the cost of capital for investing in a private 
company. In addition the beta is not found like one normally does either, by regressing stock 
returns on market returns, instead it’s found by taking a single company’s beta as given for 
the company in question.  
 There is an important point to take note of during this calculation of the weighted 
average cost of capital. The formula requires market value weights. In the first example, we 
take for granted that the market value weights of Riber and Son’s equity and debt is equal to 
Sørlandschips, in the other, we take the assumption that the market values of debt and equity 
is scaled towards the book values. Both approaches seems farfetched, and when we finally 
calculate the values we will most likely get different weights again, thus changing the 
weighted average cost of capital. This is definitely a problem, a problem also recognized in 
estimating public firms weighted average cost of capital and value. In that case you would 
have market values available, but the reason for the analysis is that you are questioning the 
market values, or else the valuation itself would be pointless. A possible solution to this 
conundrum is like Damodaran(2002) says, to iterate towards a value. What this means is that 
you back and forth, starting with the book value ratios, then estimating a value, and use these 
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value for new weights in the WACC formula. You would continue doing this until the 
estimated values match the value weights in the WACC formula.  
 Later on, we will see that the WACC will not be used, instead it will be a direct 
approach to value the equity, and a discussion of what potentially could be wrong in assuming 
the debt, or the net financial obligations, are at market value. The solutions presented by 
Damodaran(2002) in regards of beta and the cost of debt are sound approaches, compared to 
what is done here, however in this particular case there is either not enough information, or 
the effort in calculating an unsure estimate is not worth undertaking.  
 Illiquditiy discount, value of control and lack of diversification: 
  
In the case of a private firm valuation, we know that we have to consider the illiquidity 
discount, the value of control and the lack of diversification. The previous studies have shown 
poor results with large potential standard errors, when thinking about the illiquidity discount. 
The study by Silber(1991) however showed us that a fixed discount seemed unreasonable. 
Even if unreasonable, his study only showed 29% explanatory power. As discussed in the 
theoretical part of the illiquditiy discount, there are several factors that determine the 
magnitude of the discount; Liquidity of assets, financial health, size, control component and 
volatility to mention a few. Some of the studies show us how to try to incorporate these 
differences, as for instance the one factor in Silber’s regression was the amount of revenues. 
The question however remains, are the results trustworthy? Damodaran(2002) chose an 
arbitrary liquidity discount, as a base discount, and used Silber’s regression to adjust for 
variations in his factors, when estimating the discount.  
 This is theoretically sound because Silber’s regression denied the hypothesis of a fixed 
discount. However, three important critiques come to mind if doing so. First is that the 
regression from 1991, and might be a little outdated, and the second is the low explanatory 
power of 29%. Thirdly, the study was based on restricted stock studies, not private equity. 
Since private equity trades so rarely, it is not possible to get a good regression there either, but 
there have been studies on their returns when compared to public equity. The factors that 
affect the illiquidity discount are sound in theory, but given the poor studies and complexity 
of factors, this is a task that has less return than it should according to the cost put into it. You 
might not end up with more than a guess even if you try to implement all the factors. 
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This brings us to the second possible solution. The study of private equity returns by 
Ljundquist and Richardson(2003) found excess returns of 5-8%. Their study will be used as a 
basis for computing an adjusted cost of equity, which implements both the notion of 
illiquidity and some compensation for the lack of diversification. Their study was based on 
private equity funds, and not a single private entity, but nevertheless, it’s the best we got. This 
study does not give us the direct opportunity to adjust for the factors mentioned above, but it 
has others benefits. The first is that it is fairly new, and might therefore be more relevant. The 
second is that its based on private equity, which is what we are trying to value. The third 
benefit is that it most likely contains some of the expected compensation for investing in 
assets with lack of diversification. However, private equity investors and investors who 
purchase an entire private company have a different degree of control. As Damodaran(2005) 
mentions, there might be some excess returns related to the fact that private equity investors 
has a certain amount of control, but in this scenario we are assuming full control. This value 
of control will be shown later, but for now let’s assume that the premium for both illiquidity 
and lack of diversification is somewhere around 5 to 8% in regards to excess returns. Since 
the study was based on private equity funds, it is difficult to relate the spread of 5 to 8% in 
excess returns to the determinants of the discount, like Silber tried in 1991. However, a 
possible shortcut could be to look at the sample mean of his regression, and link it up towards 
the range of 5-8% excess returns. The sample mean earnings were 5,472 million, the revenues 
mean was 240  million and the mean discount was 33,75%. Sørlandschips AS revenues were 
approximately 113,8 million and their revenues 3,75 million. Although below the mean of the 
study by Silber their profit margins were better (3,75/113,8=3,3%, Sørlandschips) versus 
(5,472/240=2,28%, Silber study). To try to link up the restricted stock studies towards the 
excess returns studies for private equity funds is by no means an accurate way of knowing in 
which end of the spectrum Sørlandschips AS illiquidity discount is. However, there are not 
many alternatives, so in essence the best thing to do is to take both outer bounds of 5% to 8%, 
and calculate the values with each.  
 Adjusting the return for equity and the WACC: 
  
Based on the two outer points of leveraged beta, dependent on a D/E ratio 0,4915 or a 
D/E ratio of 3,23(Riber and Son or Book value) we will calculate the implications on both the 
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cost of equity, and the weighted average cost of capital, from the range of 5% to 8% excess 
returns due to factors like lack of liquidity and the compensation for lack of diversification: 
 
 
 Where Re is the cost of equity, E(E+D) is the weighted value of equity, (1-Tc) is the 
tax multiplier to determine the cost of debt, D(E+D) is the weighted value of debt, Rd is the 
pre tax cost of debt and Rc is the weighted average cost of capital. 
As you can see, the cost of equity ranges here from 10,04% to the maximum of 
14,34%. In addition the WACC ranges from 5,59% to 10%. This is assuming that the basic 
cost of equity numbers without any consideration (5,04 and 6,34%) of illiquidity and 
diversification are unreasonable. This calculation of the WACC was done to illustrate the 
potential fluctuation based on uncertain parameters. As mentioned it will not be used, which 
the reason will be somewhat revealed in the next segment. However, it suits its purpose to 
illustrate the potential effect the uncertainty of private firm valuation might have on discount 
rates. Before we jump into the valuation part of this thesis, let’s review the reformulation of 
the financial statements of Sørlandschips AS. 
  Reformulating the balance statement: 
 
  In order to reformulate the balance statement, one has know the business 
(Penman,2010). What is meant by this is the knowledge on how the business in question 
makes its money. What is perceived to be a financial asset might be an operating asset, 
depending on what business we are referring to. For example a bank makes its money from 
the interest spreads between borrowing and lending, and hence these accounts are operating 
assets, not financial assets and liabilities, as it would be described in many other businesses. 
The firm in question is as noted an industrial firm, which produces and distributes potato 
Calculation of the WACC
1) Levered beta 0,17
Re E(E+D) (1-Tc) D(E+D) Rd Rc
5,04 0,67 0,72 0,33 5,3 4,64
10,04 0,67 0,72 0,33 5,3 7,99
11,04 0,67 0,72 0,33 5,3 8,66
12,04 0,67 0,72 0,33 5,3 9,33
13,04 0,67 0,72 0,33 5,3 10,00
2) Levered beta 0,43
6,34 0,2364 0,72 0,7635 5,3 4,41
11,34 0,2364 0,72 0,7635 5,3 5,59
12,34 0,2364 0,72 0,7635 5,3 5,83
13,34 0,2364 0,72 0,7635 5,3 6,07
14,34 0,2364 0,72 0,7635 5,3 6,30
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chips in Norway. This makes it somewhat easy to define what is operating or financial assets, 
at least in theory.  
Lot building and property, this was 0 before 2008. Other long term debt increased with 
15 million same period. They had corporation contributions in both years before, 
approximately 6 million. Once they bought the lot they lost this. Could they have had a 
holding company that owned the building? I think it’s safe to say the lot, property and 
building is an operating asset, as its countermeasure, rent would classify as an operating 
expense since it’s the structural part of the business. Matters would be handled differently if 
the company invested excess cash in property, as an alternative to deposits. Machines and 
plant is another category which is quite simple to define as an operating asset, since it’s 
crucial for an industrial company. Moveable property, tools and equipment fall under the 
same classification. The same goes for inventory which is needed to ensure that the company 
can deliver its merchandise in short notice from when the demand occurs. Accounts 
receivable is perhaps a bit trickier to classify, depending on whether it bears interest or not. 
According to Penman (2010) a trade note can be classified as a financial asset if it bears the 
market interest. However if it’s used to attract customers its interest claim should be classified 
as an operating asset. In this case there is limited information, due to the fact that it’s a private 
firm and there were no notes to elaborate whether or not these notes bears interest, so it’s 
classified as an operating asset.  When it comes to the post other receivables we run into to the 
same problem of lack of information so it’s classified as an operating asset. On the other hand 
we also have to classify the operating liabilities. 
 Deferred tax liabilities are an example of an operating liability. The reason is that 
deferred taxes almost always is a result from accounting differences when calculating the 
operating income component of taxable income and reported book income (Penman,2010). 
Income taxes payable fall under the same description, since it is a product of the income 
generated by operations. Accounts payable is treated similar to accounts receivable in the 
respect of market interest and purpose of writing them. Since we have no such information the 
safe bet is to classify them as operating liabilities. Deferred government expenditures is 
classified as operating liabilities, as it is safe to assume these include value added tax and 
other taxes demanded to run the business. Short term corporation debt is in this case defined 
as an operating liability since it is likely due to exchange of services and products between 
divisions. The post cash and cash equivalents is a post that in many cases could profit from 
further investigation. The reason being is that this post can include cash with different 
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purposes. As Penman (2010) states it depends on whether the cash is working cash or cash 
invested in short term interest bearing securities and financial assets. Again, since this 
information is not available Penman (2010) recommends classifying this as operating assets. 
The two last post, other short term and other long term debt is safe to classify as financial 
liabilities, since no other information is available.  
In order to arrive at the free cash flow statement we also have to reformulate the income 
statement. 
 
Reformulation of the Income statement: 
  
Now that we have reformulated the balance sheet, the next on the agenda is to 
reformulate the income statement, before valuation. The reason to do this, is as Penman(2010) 
mentions to recognize what parts of the financial statements that are income generated from 
trading with customers, and the daily business, from financial activities. The first point to look 
into is the fact that the earnings number in regular income statements are affected by tax 
reduction/increase due to financing activities. This has to be adjusted, so we can see the true 
amount generated from operations.  
 Tax allocation:  
  
In order to know what exact amount of income that comes from operating activities, 
we need to separate the tax benefit(normally) from financing activities. Interest paid acts like 
a tax shield as it is tax deductible. To do this the first thing is as mentioned by Penman(2010) 
to estimate the tax shield/benefit from financing activities(Penman,2010,pg 303): 
 Tax benefit= Net interest expense* Tax rate 
 In order to get to what the operating should be, if there were no financial activities, we 
use this formula(Penman,2010,pg 304): 
 Tax on operating income= Tax expense as reported+(Net interest expense+ Tax rate)  
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 Again, the reason we’re doing this is as Penman(2010) says, to view the profitability 
from operating activities by themselves. This again gives us the opportunity to use the 
residual operating income model, not previously discussed, but neglected due to reason to 
later to be revealed. The tax allocation and the reformulated income statement will be shown 
later in this segment. 
 Potential problems when reformulating the income statements:  
  
The main point of doing a reformulation is to match the assets/liabilities on the 
balance sheet to the income/expenses reported in the income statement. Lack of disclosure 
can as Penman(2010) says cause problems in this separation process. This is especially true 
when it comes to the private business in the case demonstration.  From the outside analyst 
point of view, it is basically impossible to separate some of the items, and this will be shown 
in the application part. Much more could have been said about the reformulation, of both 
income and balance sheet. However, there are constraints in the thesis, and the fact that 
reformulation is virtually impossible to do correct (as will be demonstrated), gives little 
incentive to elaborate further. 
 The reformulated balance sheet and income statement: 
  
Below you will see the reformulated income statement and balance sheet, and a 
discussion on which issues that arise when trying to separate the activities.  
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 As previously mentioned, there were some areas where there could be uncertainty 
regarding whether the items in the balance sheet have been correctly placed or not, due to the 
lack of disclosure. In specific, the property of 7,159 million NOK could be an investment, 
which is supposed to generate returns, without it having to do anything with the operating 
activities. It could also be an operational asset, if one assumes it is necessary for the daily 
operations.  
 Accounts receivables and accounts payables can also potential bear interest, if one has 
to 1) Either pay interest on longer deadlines to ones suppliers or 2) Claim interest to longer 
deadlines on accounts receivables for customers. Another potential pitfall is the cash and cash 
equivalents.  
Reformulated Balance sheet 31.12.2008 31.12.2007 31.12.2006
Operating assets
Lot, buildings and property 7 159 000 0 0
Machines and plant 17 173 000 18 815 000 11 679 000
Mov prop, equipment and tools 0 73 000 117 000
Total inventory 4 105 000 2 835 000 2 512 000
Accounts receivables 21 703 000 1 962 000 8 412 000
Other receivables 2 900 000 803 000 116 000
Total operating assets 53 040 000 24 488 000 22 836 000
Operating Liabilities
Deferred tax liability 580 000 412 000 323 000
Accounts payable 16 130 000 4 414 000 13 351 000
Tax payable 795 000 21 000 819 000
Deferred government expenditures 532 000 485 000 -526 000
Short term corporation debt 0 0 3 671 000
Total operating liabilities 18 037 000 5 332 000 17 638 000
Net operating assets(NOA) 35 003 000 19 156 000 5 198 000
Financial assets
Cash and cash equivalents 884 000 501 000 6 205 000
Total Financial assets 884 000 501 000 6 205 000
Financial liabilities
Other long term debt 15 516 000 0 0
Other short term debt 7 632 000 9 391 000 1 401 000
Total financial liabilities 23 148 000 9 391 000 1 401 000
Net financial obligations (NFO) -22 264 000 -8 890 000 4 804 000
Common shareholders equity
Share/company capital 3 705 000 3 705 000 3 705 000
Total retained earnings 9 034 000 6 562 000 6 297 000
Total Equity (CSE) 12 739 000 10 267 000 10 002 000
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 Cash could either be investment in interest bearing securities like bonds, or working 
cash to cover the daily requirements for liquidity. To better get an understanding of what 
causes what, let’s take a look at reformulated income statement, and see where the confusion 
arises.  
 Reformulated income statement:   
  
 The first thing to take note of is that there is reported interest income in 2006 and 
2007, of 43000 and 34000 respectively. This should then be related to some of the financial 
assets. In 2006 we had cash and equivalents of 6,205 million, and 0,501 million in 2007. 
Hence at first sight it seems like some of the cash and equivalents are interest bearing 
securities. However, in 2008, this interest income disappears, although cash and equivalents 
are still positive. This could mean that the cash and equivalents in 2008 where working cash 
only. The problem is how do we separate it? We have no information on the interest, so 
determining what is working cash and what’s not is a very difficult task. You could argue that 
the cash and equivalents should be reported as financial assets in 2006 and 2007, and 
operating asset in 2008, since it appears to be working cash only.  
 The next potential issue is the sudden reported financial income of 605 000 in 2008, 
with no previous recordings in 2007 or 2006. This should imply that there should be a 
Reformulated Income statement: 
2 008 2 007 2 006
Operating revenues 113 874 000 96 580 000 87 871 000
Cost of sales 51 867 000 43 780 000 34 566 000
Gross margin 62 007 000 52 800 000 53 305 000
Operating expenses
Salaries 6 986 000 6 887 000 6 519 000
Depreciation intangible assets 3 320 000 2 321 000 1 616 000
Other operating expense 45 876 000 37 674 000 37 378 000
Operating income from sales (before tax) 5 825 000 5 918 000 7 792 000
Taxes
Taxes as reported 1 458 000 1 397 000 2 156 000
Tax on financial items and other operating inc. -174160 -264320 -25480
Operating income from sales  (after tax) 4 192 840 4 256 680 5 610 520
Financial income (expense)
Interest income 0 34 000 43 000
Other financial income 605 000 0 0
Other financial expense 1 227 000 964 000 134 000
Interest expense 0 14 000 0
Net interest expense -622 000 -944 000 -91 000
Tax effect (0,28) -174160 -264320 -25480
Net interest expense after tax -447 840 -679 680 -65 520
Comprehensive income 3 745 000 3 577 000 5 545 000
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financial asset of such a magnitude that it could justify such a financial income. As we can see 
the only one is cash and equivalents, and since the financial income is almost as large as its 
proposed counter measure on the balance sheet, we can rule that out. So what generated this 
amount of financial income? Lot, building and property went from 0 to 7,159 million NOK, 
from 2007 to 2008. If one imagines some of the operating expenses in 2007 and 2006 to be 
renting costs associated with the lot, building and property item, then perhaps they recorded 
the savings as financial income. However if so where the case, it should be reported as an 
operating income, since the fact that you have to rent a building to produce your merchandise 
is an operating activity. On the other hand, accounts receivables increased from 1,962 million 
to 21,703 million during the same period. In this period there where a financial crises that 
emerged, so perhaps their customers were unable to pay on time, and needed longer credit, 
which then causes the financial income. If that where the case, one would perhaps assume that 
the same goes for accounts receivables, is this measure also increased significantly, from 
4,414 million to 16,130 million. However no financial expense of the same sort is reported. 
The last perhaps peculiar incident from 2007 to 2008 balance sheets, was the change in 
finance structure and the cost of the debt. 
 In 2007 there were no long term debt recorded, only short term which accounted to 
9,391 million and the other financial expense where 964 thousand. This would account to a 
pretax borrowing cost of 10,26%. In 2006 the short term debt was 1,401 million with 134 
thousand other financial expenses. This results in a pretax cost of debt of 9,56%. However, if 
we assume that the borrowing cost for this short term borrowing is approximately 10%, what 
happens that cost if we look into the long term loan separately? The amount of short term debt 
was 7,632 million that year, and with 10% assumed interest we would get 763,2 thousand 
interest due to short term debt. The total amount of interest was 1 227 thousand leaving 463,8 
thousand for the long term loan of 15,516 million. That would leave the long term interest to 
approximately 3%. What’s interesting about this is the fact that the interest given by the 
Norwegian bank at this year was ranging between 3% to 5,75%(http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____67652.aspx), with 3% being at the end of the year. This 
happened due to a collapse in the financial market following the financial crises. In addition 
to this we know the government established funds of 100 billion NOK in order to help 
businesses (and households) during this 
period(http://arbeiderpartiet.no/Aktuelt/Nyhetsarkiv/Skatter-avgifter-og-oekonomisk-
politikk/Tiltakspakke), to make it easier to get loans. The fact that this happened makes it a 
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question of whether or not the current structure is equal to the cost of debt, in the respect that 
the low interest loan was a temporary event.  
 To sum up, there were issues with the reformulation of both the balance sheet and the 
income statements. What part of cash and equivalents that relate to working cash (operating 
asset) or interest bearing securities (financial assets) were hard to define. The large financial 
income reported in 2008 was also an issue. Is it from the lot, property and building or a part of 
interest payments from accounts receivable? Lastly, the cost of debt is elusive as well. The 
assumed low loan interest on the long term debt makes it hard to predict whether or not the 
current loans are at market value. One could argue that if this interest is long term, than there 
will be residual expenses related to it, if for instances the market interest changes within the 
next years. Originally the thought was to use the model of residual operating income, since 
one does not have to assume anything about the value of debt, other than its book value equals 
market value. However as Penman(2010) states the RE model should be used if we cannot 
separate financial and operating activities, and if the debt is not recorded at market value, 
which seems to be the case here.   
 RE calculation:  
  
As discussed previously the Residual earnings method should be used rather than 
residual operating if 1) We can’t separate financial and operating activities and 2) The cost of 
debt is not equal to the net financial expense. As mentioned, the fact that net borrowing cost 
has decreased dramatically through refinancing to more long term debt, suggests that the rate 
at which they borrowed may not be the rate at which they could. This also implies that 
perhaps the current borrowing cost is not the optimal one. Therefore we will first try to value 
the equity, and then separately try to value the net financial obligations, to arrive at a value of 
the firm. The real cost of debt will be as discussed a measure under high degrees of 
uncertainty.  
 A critical part to the valuation is the estimation of the growth rate in residual earnings. 
Normally one would perhaps look at several years of financial statements, and analyze the 
changes in the two value drivers of Residual earnings, ROCE and book value of common 
equity. In this case we don’t have that luxury. Instead, let’s remind ourselves of the industry 
which Sørlandchips is in. Potato chips and other snacks is a mature industry, no doubt about 
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that. In essence it is a stable business, in respect of consume. Numbers from www.ssb.no, a 
statistical database, shows us that the consume of potato products(which I can only assume 
represents snack based products) have been under a stable growth of 4,5 kg’s per person from 
1997-1999 to 5,2 kg’s in the period 2006-2008(Statistisk sentralbyrå,2008, Emne 05 Personlig 
Økonomi og Boforhold). In addition, as most people have recognized, there have also been a 
healthier trend recent years, focusing on healthy foods, losing weight, various supplements 
etc, that have grown in popularity. The reason this is discussed is that there is not much else 
information to rely on, when trying to uncover which case type of valuation the business is in. 
 Recall that we have three cases of residual earnings valuation. The first case is where 
you assume the residual earnings to converge towards zero, and that there is no residual 
earnings to calculate a continuing value. Logically this seems appropriate for a firm that 
currently has a competitive advantage at which they are assumed to lose due to increased 
competition or a less attractive market.   
 The second is when you have residual earnings at the forecast horizon, enabling you to 
calculate a continuing value of residual earnings, which is expected to remain at a constant 
level. Again, this seems appropriate for a business that is expected to maintain a certain 
competitive advantage, and earn returns over the average of the industry. The reason it’s 
proposed this way goes back to the discussion in the theoretical part. If all firms within a 
business have residual earnings (excess earnings), then unless there are restrictions in entering 
this market, suggests there is something seriously wrong with all microeconomic theory.  
 The third is a firm which it seems appropriate for growing residual earnings (excess 
earnings) at the unforeseeable future, enabling it to maintain and strengthen its competitive 
advantage.  
 Before choosing the appropriate case, let’s look at the calculated residual earnings to 
the end of 2008.  
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 Here we have chosen the price of equity of 10,04%, the low end discussed in previous 
segments regarding cost of equity and the compensation for illiquid investment and lack of 
diversification. The book value of common equity in 2005 is calculated through the stocks 
and flows equation e?,  e?,  ?@A:7:Ep,   77:p,, from Penman(2010) 
chapter seven. We don’t know the net dividends but the assumption is there where none like 
most other years. A special note is the fact that there were no reported dividends in 2008 in 
the original income statement. However, the stock and flows equation for common 
stockholders equity, does not add up if there were none in 2008.  
 e?,  e?,  ?@A:7:Ep,   77:p, 
 Where we get: 
 12,739 6788  10,267 6788  3,745 6788   77:p, 
Solved for net dividends we get that: 
  77:p,  10,267 6788  3,745 6788  12,739 6788  1,273 678879: 
 
The growth rate of residual earnings in 2007 was negative 49,52%, versus positive 
5,5% in 2008. ROCE declined from 2006 to 2007 and then increased slightly to 2008. The 
book value of equity has increased the entire period with very varying rates. From these 
numbers it’s very difficult to get a sense for where the future numbers are going. The first 
reason is the few years of accounting numbers, the second reasons is the degree of variation in 
the key figures. Although not optimal, the assumption to be made is that the company follows 
a fixed residual earnings, following 2009, towards “infinity”. The residual earnings grew in 
2008 but this might be due to the unexplained financial income in 2008, previously discussed. 
Pe 0,1004
2005 2006 2007 2008
Earnings 5 544 000 3 577 000 3 745 000
Dividends 1 273 000
Book value 4 458 000 10 002 000 10 267 000 12 739 000
RE(10,04% charge) 5096416,8 2572799,2 2714193,2
RE growth rate -49,52 % 5,50 %
Value drivers
Roce 124,36 % 35,76 % 36,48 %
Change in book values 124,36 % 2,65 % 24,08 %
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The declination in operating income in 2008 might partly be because of the financial crises, 
although as discussed, we assume this company not be as affected by others by such 
events(the beta discussion). In summary, the steady residual earnings assumption seems like a 
conservative assumption, perhaps appropriate with the limited information at hand. 
  The residual earnings where as presented, was 2 714 193 NOK in 2008. Assuming 
this continues for the near future we input the book value of 2008 in the residual earnings 
formula and solve for earnings: 
 2 714 193  ?@A:7:Ep,  !0,1004  12 739 000" 
 ?@A:7:Ep,  2 714 193  G0,1004  12 739 000H  3 993 189 
 This gives us the following formula for the equity: 
 C		K
  ;C		K  <
#  
Where we get: C		K
  12,739  C,O3T,		3  39,77 million 
Before we get to the attempt of valuing the debt, and get a firm value, let’s look at the 
value we receive from this model assuming the cost of equity is in the high end instead, as 
previously discussed. Below is the calculation of new RE with a different discount rate: 
 
 
Due to the higher discount rate, the residual earnings have changed as well. Following 
the same assumption of steady residual earnings in 2009 and beyond, the new number is 
2 272 712 million approximately. The new value then becomes: 
C		K
  12,739  2,2727121,1434  1  28,59 678879: F 
Pe 0,1434
2005 2006 2007 2008
Earnings 5 544 000 3 577 000 3 745 000
Dividends 0 0 1273000
Book value 4 458 000 10 002 000 10 267 000 12 739 000
RE(10,04% charge) 4904722,8 2142713,2 2272712,2
RE growth rate -56,31 % 6,07 %
Value drivers
Roce 124,36 % 35,76 % 36,48 %
Change in book values 124,36 % 2,65 % 24,08 %
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The difference in value is striking, from 39,77 to 28,59 million, from 10,04% cost of 
equity to 14,34% percent, which accounts to a difference of 39,1% increase, going from 
14,34% to 10,04%. Take note however, that in the second case, the implied earnings growth 
from 2008 to 2009 is higher than it was with the 10,04% equity cost. This stems from the fact 
that the required rate of return is higher and hence the earnings in 2009 will be deducted a 
larger value, to get to the residual earnings. If taken for granted the value of equity is between 
28,59 million and 39,77 million NOK, we will now proceed to look into the value of the debt.  
Now remember, the 10,04% cost of equity is based on the lowest excess return of 5%, 
and the lowest beta calculated earlier. The second valuation is based on the highest excess 
returns of 8% and the highest calculated levered beta with the book D/E ratio. The excess 
return study was as discussed based on private equity fund investment, who’s excess returns 
might partly be affected by lack of diversification in addition to the lack of liquidity. In that 
respect one would assume an investor purchasing an entire firm instead to be more affected by 
this lack of diversification. In that respect the value based on the highest discount rate seems 
more appropriate, to account for some of this. As noted before, we don’t really know which of 
the factors (illiquidity, lack of diversification or value of control), contribute to this excess 
returns, so it is in essence a poor valuation regardless of which end of the spectrum one 
chooses. But if forced to make an assumption about the value, a value of equity closer to 
28,59 million seems the most reasonable.  
Value of debt(net financial obligations) 
 
If you recall the reformulation of both the income statement and the balance sheet, 
there were some problems in determining were the different element belonged as far as 
operating or financial activities are concerned. As a recap the cash and equivalents were 
difficult to separate, as far as what was working capital or interest bearing securities. There 
were also the fact that there were a rather large amount of financial income in 2008 which had 
no financial asset to measure up against. Thirdly, the interest on the long term loan in 2008 
seemed very low, at least considering a long term perspective, and in addition to this, there 
were a restructuring of long term/short term debt, and were previously no long term debt was 
recorded.  
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All these elements suggest that the true cost of debt, and whether or not the net 
financial obligations are at market value, seems uncertain. We could of course assume that it 
was at market value, but that does not seem appropriate. As an example, consider the apparent 
loan interest of approximately 3% on the long term debt to be lower than the market interest. 
This would yield a benefit for the company, since it would then be able to pay interest less 
than long term market interest. In this example we assume that the prevailing market interest 
for such a loan is 4%, and that the loan in paid back in its entirety at the end of the 10 year 
period. Below is the calculated value of net financial expense: 
 
Since we assume that the debt currently has a current interest lower than the market 
rate of interest there is a residual from having such a loan, similar to what we saw with 
earnings. The loan is cheaper than it should have been and hence generates residual net 
financial expenses which is calculated like this(Penman,2010,pg 442): 
 >p7@8 : o7:@:m7@8 y:p  ?,  !yr  1"F, 
Where ?, is net financial expense, yris the cost of debt and F,is net financial 
obligations. Since we assume that the loan currently is at a lower interest than the market 
interest, the Residual net financial expense is expected to become negative, as the sum shows. 
These numbers are of course on an after tax basis. The present value of the residual financial 
expenses is 969 197 kroner. If we then assume that the rest of the financial obligations are at 
market value the new value of the net financial obligations is the market value of the net 
financial obligations plus the present value of residual net financial expenses which is: 
22 264 000+ 969 198=23 233 198 million.   
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5
Interest reported 463 800 463 800 463 800 463 800 463 800
Net interest cost 333936 333936 333936 333936 333936
interest rate 0,02152204 1,02152204 1,04350728 1,06596569 1,08890745 1,11234296
Book value 15 516 000
Residual financial expense -112924,8 -112924,8 -112924,8 -112924,8 -112924,8
Discount rate 1,0288 1,05842944 1,08891221 1,12027288 1,15253674
Present value Residual expenses -109763,608 -106690,91 -103704,228 -100801,155 -97979,3496
Cosf of debt(after tax) 0,0288
Year 6 7 8 9 10
Interest reported 463 800 463 800 463 800 463 800 463 800
Net interest cost 333936 333936 333936 333936 333936
Discount rate 1,13628285 1,16073798 1,18571943 1,21123853 1,23730686
Residual financial expense -112924,8 -112924,8 -112924,8 -112924,8 -112924,8
Present value Residual expenses 1,1857298 1,21987881 1,25501132 1,29115565 1,32834093
Total value residual expenses -95236,5373 -92570,5067 -89979,1084 -87460,2531 -85011,9101
-969197,6
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Take note that this is a hypothetical example. There is no information revealing either 
the interest on the long term debt or the short term debt. In addition we don’t know the 
maturity of these loans or the repayment plan. In addition there were other issues as well in 
the reformulation, that could have had implications on the value of net financial obligations. 
This was merely an example to illustrate what the net financial obligations could have been 
worth if indeed the interest was too low, in relation to the market interest.   
Residual earnings and the value of debt: Can we trust these results? 
 
With private firms there is a potential problem with earnings reported in the financial 
statement as previously discussed. Management might have reported to large salaries instead 
of dividends, discretionary expenses might be present and in general the accounting rules 
from public to private firm might differ. This might make the residual earnings model more 
inaccurate then it by normal standards is.  
In addition, the inputs for estimating the cost of equity is also more suspect than 
usually. With public firms it is hard enough to get an estimate of the cost of equity, but with 
private firms we have encountered more problems. The lack of accounting information, the 
fact that private firm rarely trades, and the fact that the industry at which Sørlandschips AS is 
in is not comparable to the OBSE industry, makes the beta estimate highly uncertain. There 
are by no means of the imagination reason to trust these estimates.  
We also saw from the reformulation of the financial statements and the cost of debt 
calculation, that the value of the debt is also an uncertain measure. The other problem was 
determining what potential case of valuation Sørlandschips AS were in, since the three year 
accounting data does not give much to go on, and that there are little public information which 
could lead to a justifiable conclusion. All these issues give an incentive to try to use the 
method of comparables in addition. 
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Method of comparables: 
 
 In addition to the residual earnings model valuation, we will also try to value the 
equity of the firm by using the method of comparables previously discussed. There have been 
large amounts of complications and difficulties in estimating the parameters needed for 
normal valuation, giving the output results in the residual earnings model little precedence. 
Even though we discovered that the industry at which Sørlandschips AS is in, is not directly 
relatable to the industry on the OBSE, perhaps it still could be used, at least as a reference 
point. As mentioned previously investment bankers floating initial public offering often refer 
to the methods of comparables in order to get a feel for what the offering should be made at.  . 
The first thing in the application part, is going through the three steps noted by 
Penman(2010). The first is to identify the comparable firms. 
 The firms have partly already been identified, through the part where we tried to find a 
comparable beta for Sørlandschips AS. Only Rieber and Son were viewed upon as 
comparable, from the stocks listed in the same industry in the OBSE. However, let’s assume 
we view the credential of a comparable firm as a firm that gets most of their revenues from 
selling food.  Lets remind ourselves what Damodaran(2002) concludes as credentials for 
making the assumption of a comparable firm. He stated that risk, growth potential and cash 
flows where the most important aspects of what is defined as a comparable firm. Another way 
of looking at it is to assume firms within the same industry share these characteristics, 
although not always entirely true, as discussed previously. Lets for now assume the 
companies within that industry are comparable, in terms of risk, growth and cash potential, 
even though we discussed previously this is probably not the case. In addition, lets assume 
Ekornes ASA is valid subject as well, due to its similar risk profile (beta) as Rieber and Son 
ASA.  
 With the comparable firms at hand we need a set of multiples at which we desire to 
measure the firms intended market value. The most common ones, Price/Earnings, Price/Sales 
and Price/Book will be used. In the price/earnings discussion previously, there were three 
different ways of measuring this ratio. We could either use recent financial year’s earnings, 
the expected next years or the trailing 4 quarterly earnings in the denominator. Since future 
expected earnings are included in the price, the most reasonable thing seemed to use the 
expected future earnings. Since we don’t have such measures for this firm we will have to 
settle with recent financial years earnings which are for the year 2008. Related to the earnings 
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measure, we might also stumble upon firms with negative earnings, at which the 
Price/earnings ratio makes little sense. This issue will be addressed in step number three, 
when calculating the multiples and choosing which metrics/methods to give weights to the 
different multiples.  
 When choosing the weights of the firms multiples, it’s important to remember that the 
metrics chosen has implicit assumptions connected to them. If you chose geometrical average 
you are basically assuming that the industry in average has similar risk, growth and cash flow 
potential (or earnings if you prefer). Before calculating the multiples and the estimated value 
of Sørlandschips AS equity, recall the betas of the comparable firms: 
    
 By definition, we know that risk affects the multiples, as shown by the reverse 
engineering in the theoretical discussion of comparable valuation. The observant reader will 
notice that some of the firms were taken out the sample. The reason is simply lack of annual 
rapports, stock prices at that time etc. If we follow the assumption made earlier, that 
Sørlandschips AS exposure to systematic risk is probably quite low, we could make a 
weighted average where we take this into consideration. Below is a calculation of the 
multiples, with the weights of 1/10 on Aker Seafood’s and Codfarmers, which have the 
highest beta, 2/10 on Lerøy Seafood and Ekornes, and finally 4/10 to Rieber and Son the 
company viewed most comparable. Based on this the following value came from the different 
multiples: 
 
 
 As you can see the different multiples give very different outputs as far as value is 
concerned, from 15,5 million to 62,9 million(approximately). However, take note that the 
average value of 39,8 million is fairly similar to the value calculated with the residual 
Betas
Aker Seafoods 0,4726
Ekornes 0,1759
Codfarmers 0,7624
Lerøy seafood 0,2302
Rieber and Son 0,1745
Average Beta 0,36312
Sørlandschips P/E weighted P/S weighted P/B weighted Value of equity
Sales 113 874 000 0,55 62881933
Earnings 3 745 000 10,96 41033493
book value 12 739 000 1,22 15507664
Average value 39807697
94 
 
earnings model, when we had 10,04% cost of equity. A note of interest is that the negative 
earnings multiples where in fact included in this estimation. Part of the reason this was done is 
because if you use the average, or different weights, the implications is not as pronounced, 
even though as a standalone measure, it makes no sense. In addition, and perhaps more 
importantly, taking away the negative earnings measures makes the estimation skewed, 
towards the high end of the P/E range. The calculation and the numbers can be found in 
appendix 3. The question now is, is this the best we can do as far as comparable valuation is 
concerned in regards to private firms? Recall that the accounting standards might be different 
and the fact that there might be discretionary expenses in private companies, making the 
earnings measure somewhat unreliable or uncomparable to public firms. If this is indeed the 
case we could follow the weighted approach above and add weights concerning which 
multiple is most appropriate. The weights are given arbitrary, to illustrate the fact that we trust 
the Price/Earnings measure the least: 
 
    
 Here the Price/earnings multiple were given only 10%, Price/sales 45% and 
Price/Book value 45%. The value here is only slightly lower(39,38 million) than the one 
where no such considerations where made(39,38 million). In appendix 3, you will find 
different ways of calculating these multiples. In addition to these two estimations there have 
been done three additional ones. One where the arithmetic average is applied (for the 
weights), the second where negative price/earnings multiples where removed and the third 
where the earnings and market value where aggregated to get a Price/earnings ratio. For the 
specially interested these can be found in the appendix 3.  
 There are some things that have to be noted if using such multiples for private firms. 
The first is that the public firms are not subject to the illiquidity discount, lack of 
diversification and the potential value of control.  So in essence, even if it theoretically where 
completely comparable, the multiples would most likely overvalue the private equity, given 
that the lack of diversification and illiquidity discount is larger than the value of control. 
Given that we think the value is too high, and would like to attach a illiquidity discount on the 
Sørlandschips P/E weighted(10%) P/S weighted(45%) P/B weighted(45%) Value of equity
Sales 113 874 000 0,55 28296870
Earnings 3 745 000 10,96 4103349
book value 12 739 000 1,22 6978449
Weighted value 39378668
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value, we could perhaps use the fixed discount of 20% found in the more recent studies on 
restricted stock discussed in the illiquidity part of the thesis. 
 The value of the equity in the last examples approximately 39,38 million. A 20% 
discount would yield a value of (39,38/1,2)= 32,82 million. As you recall this was the most 
recent study on restricted stock and probably more appropriate than the older studies. Ideally 
we would like to attach a discount for the lack of diversification as well, but it will suffice that 
we know this value might be too high due to this. 
 In addition, these multiples are calculated based on numbers from 2008, when there 
were worldwide financial crises. Behavioral finance is not a topic for this thesis, but there 
might be some undervaluing going on in the part of the recession when almost all investors 
are overwhelmed with fear of losing money. So basically, even if totally correct, the estimate 
of 32,82 million could 1) be to low because of a pessimistic market and 2) Be to high due to 
not including a compensation for diversification.   
  
 Discounted cash flow calculation and valuation:  
  
The discounted cash flow model was only briefly discussed in the theoretical segment 
and the application of this model will be brief as well. There are several reasons for this, and 
the most important ones stem from the private firm in question. As discussed, there were 
several disadvantages mentioned by Penman(2010) in his segment regarding the discounted 
cash flow model. The recap, they were: 1) DCF valuation is partly a liquidation concept, and 
treats investment as a loss of value 2) Fails to recognize value created in the short run, 3) 
Forces the analyst to sometimes build high weights into the continuing and speculative part of 
valuation and 4) Is difficult to use when faced with firms with current negative cash flows.  
 In this case there were no cash flow statement reported, so instead of forecasting 
accruals etc the methods used to calculate the free cash flows where method 1 and 2, 
described by Penman(2010,pg 342): 
 Method 1:   i  Fi  ∆Fh 
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 Where C-I is the free cash flow, OI is comprehensive operating income and ∆Fh 
is change in net operating assets. The second method is to use the net financial 
obligations/assets change as a starting point instead: 
Method 2: With either Net financial obligations (Penman,2010,pg 342):  
   i 
?  ∆F    j7:. 7:Ap 7: 7:m96  ∆j7:. 7:Ap 7: n @8@:m pn 
 Or with net financial assets: 
 
   i 
∆h  i    j7:. 7:Ap 7: 7:m96  ∆j7:. 7:Ap 7: n @8@:m pn 
 The first formula is when you have net financial obligations and the second where you 
have net financial assets. Below are the free cash flows calculated using both methods:  
 
  
 As you can see there were negative free cash flows in both 2007 and 2008, using both 
methods, which basically amounted to the same number. In order to use this method, we 
would have to calculate/estimate when the cash flow turns positive, by how much and how 
much we expect it to grow. One of the main problems with the discounted cash flow method 
appears when we indeed have a case of negative cash flows, like Sørlandschips AS in this 
case. The problems mentioned in the introduction of this segment seem to be present in this 
Method 1)
2008 2007 2006
Operating income 4 192 840 4 256 680 5 610 520
Net op. Assets 35 003 000 19 156 000 5 198 000
Delta Net op.assets 15 847 000 13 958 000
FCF -11 654 160 -9 701 320
Method 2)
2008 2007 2006
Net financial assets/obligations -22 264 000 -8 890 000 4 804 000
Delta NFO(NFA) 13 374 000 13 694 000
Net financi income/expense -447 840 -679 680 -65 520
dividends 1 273 000 0 0
Minority interest in income 0 3 312 000 2 643 000
Minority interest on balance sheet 0 0 3 671 000
Delta minority interest balance sh. 0 -3 671 000
FCF -11 653 160 -9 702 320
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case. Indeed it looks at first sight as if the investments here are causing a decrease in value. 
Recognizing the value potentially created also seems difficult. The investment return in net 
operating assets in 2008 would have to be “estimated” somehow, in respect to how much 
return they are expected to create and when the cash flows arrive. Most likely this would force 
the main part of the value to be focused on the continuing value. It’s even possible that the 
next year(2009) would have negative cash flows as well, making the continuing value(which 
is referred to as the speculative part) to contain more than 100% of the value calculated. This 
is of course not preferable, since one the main tenets of fundamental analysis is to anchor a 
valuation on what you know instead of speculation. This case right here would force us to 
anchor all of the value on pure speculation. Of course, the residual earnings model presented 
earlier is also of speculative nature. Generally since it requires a continuing value as well, but 
specifically since there are so many uncertainties regarding private company valuation. If 
there indeed were positive cash flows in this case, one could argue that this model should be 
used as well, taking into consideration that the accounting earnings might not be correct due 
to the various reasons discussed previously.   
 
 Value of control: 
  
As mentioned this part of the valuation is a particularly tricky one. Assuming the 
notion of a private investor buying the entire firm, there should undoubtedly be some sort of 
control premium associated with this, compared to another investment with no control. The 
reasons discussed where the fact that you might be able to generate more earnings, if the 
incumbent management weren’t running the business optimally, and the fact that if the assets 
allow it, you might be able to offset some of the distress with the purchase of an illiquid asset, 
which a private company is.  
 In order to evaluate the current management performance you would need much more 
information than just a financial statement report for three years. You would have to know the 
business, and optimally know the decisions made by the current management, and an ability 
to evaluate these. This is information we don’t have so no such attempt will be made although 
an example following the example in the theoretical part is going to be provided.  
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Let’s assume that due to the current management, the earnings in 2008 are 10% lower 
than they should be, with the cause being both discretionary expenses and poor management. 
In the same breath we are still assuming that the growth opportunities are limited, due to what 
was discussed as a fairly stable business in which the company operates in. Given the lower 
cost of equity of 10,04%, the new residual earnings would be: 
 
Using this input to calculate the new value of equity: 
 Where we get: C		K
  12,739  T,	KKJT,3,		3  43,503 678879:  
Since the value of control is the difference between value as it is run now (39,77 
million with 10,04% cost of equity) and 43,503 million, it would be approximately 3,73 
million in this specific case. Of course this example is very simplified, it does not take into 
consideration of unexploited growth opportunities, it only changes the last financial year’s 
earnings, but it is done simply to give a notion of how to incorporate it, if one had such 
information.  
Ultimately we would like to consider the potential impact the value of control has on 
the illiquidity distress to the investor as well. If you recall the value of control discussion, the 
nature and the magnitude of the non operating assets seem to have some influence on this 
premium. Logically a company with high degrees of liquid financial assets would be 
preferable as far as liquidity goes, in the fact that the need for liquidity at least partially could 
be resolved liquidating some of these assets. In 2006 the company had more financial assets 
in cash and cash equivalents than it had financial obligations. Other than that the firm was 
short term financed in 2007 and a mix of short term and long term debt in 2008. The cash and 
equivalents in 2008 were 884 000, but it is really difficult to say if this is an amount that 
would have a positive effect to an investor considering his liquidity needs. As mentioned this 
thesis was more about discovering the potential problems, then to actually try to solve them, 
Pe Residual earnings, VOC No_growth RE
2008 2009
Earnings 4 119 500 4 367 689
Dividends 0 0
Book value 12 739 000 17 106 689
RE(10,04% charge) 3088693,2 3088693,4
RE growth rate 20,05 % 0,00 %
Value drivers
Roce 40,12 %
Change in book values 24,08 %
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as most of them has proven basically unsolvable. This segment was merely to illustrate the 
considerations needed to be taken, which in most cases are of highly subjective nature.      
 
Conclusion: 
 
So the question is what is the company worth? To be honest we don’t know. If 
anything this thesis has shown the difficulties regarding valuing private firms, and the 
uncertainty with these estimates. The equity has been ranged from 28,59 million to 43,503 
million. The debt has been discussed to probably not be valued at book value and perhaps 
worth a premium.  
Normal valuation might be difficult enough itself, as there have been written several 
books on the topic, with different methods giving different valuations. In addition to this, we 
have learned that private firm valuation, from an outside point of view, is especially difficult. 
The differences in private firms versus public firms demands other possible solutions to the 
cost of equity parameters and cost of debt parameters, in addition one should theoretically 
account for the issues of diversification, illiquidity and value of control as well. This has 
proven to be very difficult, although we know that these are things to consider with private 
firm valuation. In an ideal world one would value the firm from inside, with several years of 
accounting data, detailed knowledge about the firms operations and growth opportunities. It is 
basically the lack of information that has caused most of the problems and shortcuts taken in 
this thesis, which is no surprise. The thesis in itself has not proven to be conclusive, but rather 
it should inform the reader of the potential traps and extra caution demanded if valuing a 
private firm. There were never an intention of trying to get a precise estimate as what value is 
concerned, rather than that, investigate what it potentially might be, taking all considerations.    
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Appendix 1: Income statement 
 
Note: Data for the financial statements were collected from www.1881.no (see 
references) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income statement 2008 2007 2006
Valutakode NOK NOK NOK
Revenues 113 874 000 96 580 000 87 871 000
Other op. Income 0 0 0
Total operating revenues 113 874 000 96 580 000 87 871 000
Cost of goods sold 51 867 000 43 780 000 34 566 000
Change in stocks 0 0 0
Wage cost 6 986 000 6 887 000 6 519 000
Appreciation intangible assets 3 320 000 2 321 000 1 616 000
Write down intangible assets 0 0 0
Other op. Cost 45 876 000 37 674 000 37 378 000
Total op. Cost 108 049 000 90 662 000 80 079 000
Operating Income 5 825 000 5 918 000 7 792 000
Income from investment in subsidiary 0 0 0
Total other interest income 0 34 000 43 000
Total other financial income 605 000 0 0
Total financial income 605 000 34 000 43 000
Total other interest expense 0 14 000 0
Total other financial expense 1 227 000 964 000 134 000
Total financial expense 1 227 000 978 000 134 000
Net finance -622 000 -944 000 -91 000
Earnings before taxes 5 203 000 4 974 000 7 700 000
Taxes reported 1 458 000 1 397 000 2 156 000
Net income before unusual items 3 745 000 3 577 000 5 544 000
Unusual income 0 0 0
Unusual expenses 0 0 0
Net unusual items 0 0 0
Taxes on unusual income 1 458 000 1 397 000 2 156 000
Net income 3 745 000 3 577 000 5 544 000
Dividends 0 0 0
Minority interest 0 3 312 000 2 643 000
Transfers to/from common equity 3 745 000 265 000 2 901 000
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Appendix 2: Balance statement 
 
 
 
Balance statement 2008 2007 2006
Assets
Research and development 0 0 0
Franchise, licence and patents 0 0 0
Deferred tax advantage 0 0 0
Total intangible fixed assets 0 0 0
Lot, buildings and property 7 159 000 0 0
Machines and plant 17 173 000 18 815 000 11 679 000
Ships,rigs,plain etc. 0 0 0
Mov prop, equipment and tools 0 73 000 117 000
Total noncurrent assets 24 333 000 18 888 000 11 797 000
Stocks/investments subsidiary 0 0 0
Investments in stocks and share 0 0 0
Bonds and longterm debt? 0 0 0
Total financial assets 0 0 0
Total fixed assets 24 333 000 18 888 000 11 797 000
Total inventory 4 105 000 2 835 000 2 512 000
Accounts receivables 21 703 000 1 962 000 8 412 000
Other receivables 2 900 000 803 000 116 000
Corporation receivables 0 0 0
Claims on share capital 0 0 0
Total receivables 24 602 000 2 766 000 8 527 000
Stocks and shares same corporation 0 0 0
Marketbased stocks 0 0 0
Marketbased bonds 0 0 0
Other marketbased fin. Instruments. 0 0 0
Other fin. Instruments 0 0 0
Total Investments 0 0 0
Cash and cash equivalents 884 000 501 000 6 205 000
Total Current assets 29 591 000 6 102 000 17 244 000
Total assets 53 924 000 24 990 000 29 041 000
EQUITY AND DEBT
Share/company capital 3 705 000 3 705 000 3 705 000
Preferred stock 0 0 0
share premium account 0 0 0
Total Invested equity 3 705 000 3 705 000 3 705 000
Reserve for valuation variances 0 0 0
Other reserves 9 034 000 6 562 000 6 297 000
Total retained earnings 9 034 000 6 562 000 6 297 000
Minority interest 0 0 0
Total Equity 12 739 000 10 267 000 10 002 000
Debt
Pension obligations 0 0 0
Deferred tax liability 580 000 412 000 323 000
Other provisions 0 0 0
Total other provisions 580 000 412 000 323 000
Long term corp. Debt 0 0 0
sub. Loan capital 0 0 0
Other long term debt 15 516 000 0 0
Total long term debt 16 096 000 412 000 323 000
Convertible loan 0 0 0
Certificate loans 0 0 0
debt to creditinstitutions 0 0 0
Accounts payable 16 130 000 4 414 000 13 351 000
Tax payable 795 000 21 000 819 000
Deferred public expenses 532 000 485 000 -526 000
Dividends 0 0 0
Short term corporation debt 0 0 3 671 000
Other short term debt 7 632 000 9 391 000 1 401 000
Total short term debt 25 089 000 14 311 000 18 716 000
Total debt 41 185 000 14 723 000 19 039 000
Total equity and debt 53 924 000 24 990 000 29 041 000
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Appendix 3: Comparables 
 
Note: Annual rapports at which the input was found is in the reference list. 
The method of comparables:Input numbers
Betas P_2008E OS.2008E BookE_2008E Sales 2008 Earnings_2008
Aker Seafoods 0,4726 6,45 48 598 291 826000000 2678000000 -79000000
Ekornes 0,1759 66,3 36 824 866 1 103 533 000 2673100000 347600000
Codfarmers 0,7624 4 20 394 650 191 095 000 74 215 000 -147 950 000
Lerøy seafood 0,2302 50 53 577 368 3 764 343 000 6 057 053 000 127052000
Rieber and Son 0,1745 35,5 76 430 000 1 966 547 000 6 806 397 000 187 540 000
Average Beta 0,36312
1)Pure average, negative earnings included
Betas P/E P/S P/B
Aker Seafoods 0,4726 -3,967835151 0,117049655 0,379490287
Ekornes 0,1759 7,02384527 0,913354763 2,212429185
Codfarmers 0,7624 -0,551393038 1,099219834 0,426900756
Lerøy seafood 0,2302 21,08481881 0,442272571 0,711643014
Rieber and Son 0,1745 14,46766023 0,398634549 1,379710223
Average Beta 0,36312 7,611419225 0,594106274 1,022034693
Sørlandschips P/E average P/S average P/B average Value of equity
Sales 113 874 000 0,594106274 67653257,89
Earnings 3 745 000 7,611419225 28504765
book value 12 739 000 1,022034693 13019699,96
Average 36392574,28
2)Removing negative earnings measures
Betas P/E P/S P/B
Aker Seafoods 0,4726 0,117049655 0,379490287
Ekornes 0,1759 7,02384527 0,913354763 2,212429185
Codfarmers 0,7624 1,099219834 0,426900756
Lerøy seafood 0,2302 21,08481881 0,442272571 0,711643014
Rieber and Son 0,1745 14,46766023 0,398634549 1,379710223
Average Beta 0,36312 14,19210811 0,594106274 1,022034693
Sørlandschips P/E average P/S average P/B average Value of equity
Sales 113 874 000 0,594106274 67653257,89
Earnings 3 745 000 14,19210811 53149444,86
book value 12 739 000 1,022034693 13019699,96
Average 44607467,57
3)Aggregate the earnings and compute new price too earnings
Earnings Market values
Aker Seafoods -79000000 313458977
Ekornes 347600000 2441488616
Codfarmers -147 950 000 191 095 000
Lerøy seafood 127052000 3 764 343 000
Rieber and Son 187 540 000 1 966 547 000
Aggregate values 435242000 8676932593
Aggregated P/E 19,93588071
Sørlandschips P/E aggregatedP/S average P/B average Value of equity
Sales 113 874 000 0,594106274 67653257,89
Earnings 3 745 000 19,93588071 74659873,27
book value 12 739 000 1,022034693 13019699,96
Average 51777610,37
